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 This thesis analyzes the work and effectiveness of formal and informal resident 
management groups in public housing in Chicago, IL during 1940 to 1990 as reported by 
local newspapers.  The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) is infamous for managerial 
neglect of buildings and, more importantly, its residents.  It is for this reason that CHA 
residents throughout the city regularly came together on their own merit in an attempt to 
effect change and better their circumstances.  This thesis evaluates the process in which 
Chicago public housing residents politicized themselves in order to create better living 
situations for themselves and their families in project buildings.  Public housing in 
Chicago cannot be understood as a policy without evaluating the role that residents have 
played in policymaking.  It has been easy to overlook their accomplishments because 
much of the strides residents made in bettering their lives were often limited to their own 
buildings.  Residents often came together to assign each other building maintenance tasks 
that should have been taken care of by the CHA, but usually were not.  Eventually, many 
of these groups became politicized and were able to effect change from within the CHA, 
all the way up to the federal level.  This is evidenced in resident’s successful campaign to 
gain resident management status through various programs after 1987.  This process is 
  
evaluated in this thesis by drawing on resources such as previously recorded interviews 
compiled by editors, and most importantly in reports from The Chicago Defender and 
The Chicago Tribune.  Both newspapers provided a wealth of publications which 
provided insight into the activities of Chicago public housing resident lives by reporting 
activities in project buildings, and also exposing the shortcomings of the CHA in which 
residents continuously fought against.   
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`This thesis seeks to better understand the important relationship between the 
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and its residents in an attempt to further the historical 
conversation surrounding the failure of Chicago public housing.  Along with an 
evaluation of the general history of the development of public housing in Chicago, the 
role that tenants played in attempting to change and better their living conditions is as 
important to understanding the program’s shortcomings and successes, as is the study of 
agency and legislative decision making.  Residents came together forming tenant groups 
for a variety of reasons from the very onset of public housing in Chicago. Over time, 
many of these groups transitioned into formal organizations that actively worked with 
city hall as well as the CHA and federal government to create policy.  Some of these 
groups were decidedly less formal small groups that met regularly to address the 
immediate needs of CHA buildings.  Others formed with the intentions of seeking federal 
funding in order to be a political force and others came in the form of gangs, many of 
whose initial reason for coming together was to effect positive change in their 
communities.  Other tenant groups were actually formed and funded by the CHA or the 
government in order to establish a working relationship between the residents and their 
CHA landlords in an effort to make both parties more accountable and satisfied. The 
CHA is infamous for managerial neglect of buildings and, more importantly, its residents.  
It is for this reason that CHA residents throughout the city regularly came together on 
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their own merit in an attempt to effect change and better their circumstances. This thesis 
evaluates the process in which Chicago public housing residents politicized themselves in 
order to create better living situations for their families in project buildings. To 
understand how this process occurred, the voices of public housing residents become as 
important as those of governmental authorities.  Whereas scholars have examined the 
history of Chicago public housing, few have assessed its success and failure through the 
lens of how journalists communicated the actions of involved people.  The news reported 
by the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Defender (the mouthpiece of African 
Americans) differed in important ways.  The Tribune most often provided informative 
insight into public housing issues where it concerned resident interactions with the CHA 
and other civil agencies.  The Defender served as a voice for Chicago public housing 
residents informing the public of meetings, important elections, and activities of different 
resident management groups throughout the city which helped created greater cohesion 
for the public housing resident community.  Published oral interviews validate the 
Chicago Defender perspective.  Thus, this thesis offers a connection to how social 
identity can influence the delivery of information and consequently highlight a need for 
action to change policies and systems.  In the cause of Chicago’s public housing 
directives, stories in the Chicago Tribune emphasize the role of the CHA and other 
government agencies, whereas the Chicago Defender argued for change in destructive 
policies through exposing the important work of the active resident community.   
Historians have long debated why Chicago public housing has proved to be such a 
disastrous failure.  Many have also speculated on how the lack of success of a promising 
policy might have been prevented or avoided altogether.  The tumultuous relationship 
 3 
between the CHA and the residents of its housing projects is acknowledged, but few have 
effectively analyzed how this relationship systematically broke down over time and the 
ways that public housing could have thrived had this disunion been fostered into a more 
positive exchange.  Also understudied is the heavy influence that CHA residents had on 
policy and the great deal of organizing among themselves that took place as soon as tenants 
began moving into project developments.  The existing historical conversation regarding 
the failings of Chicago public housing revolve, in large part, around the actions and 
agendas of legislators and other civic leaders, or in other words, individuals in positions of 
power, whether white or black.  What has not been given enough consideration is the 
critical role residents played in the political saga that is Chicago public housing.  While 
government officials and CHA directors were debating policy and enacting legislation, 
CHA residents were right alongside them, attempting to influence policy as best they could.   
To understand why Chicago public housing failed so miserably, the role of 
tenants needs to be critically evaluated on political, economic, social, and cultural levels.  
Public housing tenants are often assigned blame for the deterioration of buildings for 
simply being a part of a population who is stereotyped as being prone to unemployment, 
lacking education, being violence, embracing welfare culture and political apathy.  It is 
clear from prior study and existing individual testimony that undeniably, tenants are often 
victims of their circumstances, unable to effect change because of an overall lack of 
power.  However, it is also evident that countless public housing residents across the 
United States came together to seek solutions to the daily problems they faced.  While 
individual stories from tenants are a crucial part of grasping the roles tenants played in 
trying to better their situation, residents efforts also need to be considered from their 
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collective voice to fully appreciate not only the effects of public housing policy, but the 
efforts residents took upon themselves to better their own conditions.  
Chicago public housing is not a topic devoid of extensive analysis and review.  
Multiple experts have investigated possible reasons why Chicago’s history with public 
housing has been an unmistakable failure.  The question of why public housing has been 
so overwhelmingly unsuccessful is not new to urban history, neither is the idea that 
oppressed class’s voice is the one of that needs to be exposed to understand why.  
However, the voice of the oppressed has more commonly been studied from the voice of 
worker rather than specifically the black single mother.  In other words, the study of the 
wildly successful Worker’s Rights Movement throughout 20th Century, led by notable 
figures like Martin Luther King Jr. who helped incite the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, overshadowed and overlapped the lesser known, less well organized, and more 
sporadic tenant’s rights movement happening in various parts of the country.1  
One of the pioneers in the study of public housing in Chicago was Devereux 
Bowley Jr. who published The Poorhouse: Subsidized Housing in Chicago in 1978.  His 
work was one of the first to contend that serious attention needed to be paid to the status 
of public housing in Chicago and to discuss it from a historically preemptive perspective, 
citing the possibilities for further problems with the program.  In the book’s first edition, 
Bowley evaluates housing in Chicago during the years 1895 – 1976, looking at how the 
poor obtained housing before public housing was available and what led to the eventual 
creation of the disastrous high rise design.  In the second edition of the book, which 
                                                           
1
 Philip A. Klinkler with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality 
in America. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 242. 
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Bowley published in 2012, focus on the years after 1980, into the 21st Century and how 
the demolition of the high rises and the transition to rent subsidized housing policies has 
occurred.  Bowley’s work is comprehensive and informative.  It also, unfortunately, lacks 
much critical analysis of the role that tenant’s played in public housing’s transformation 
and how their voice effected policy.2   
In 1983, dynamic historian Arnold Hirsch published, Making the Second Ghetto: 
Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960.  Hirsch contends that ghettos in Chicago were 
created and solidified with government policy and makes very clear that the behaviors 
and actions of white policymakers in Chicago are to blame, owing to the fact that they 
wielded the actual power over housing decisions.  Besides disagreements over various 
lesser issues, whites regularly and effectively came together across social and economic 
lines on the issue of racial housing segregation.  As the Second Great Migration created 
an unprecedented need for black housing in Chicago, overcrowding led blacks to seek 
housing in white communities.  Hirsch also goes into great detail about the violence 
blacks endured at the hands of white community members who sought to keep African 
Americans from living in their neighborhoods.  The government and media effectively 
covered up and whitewashed much of the violence that was occurring in the city over 
issues of housing segregation during these years in particular, 1940 – 1960, in an attempt 
to make it seem as though the legislation they were passing in terms of housing was being 
well-received by all.3   
                                                           
2 Devereux Bowley Jr., The Poorhouse: Subsidized Housing in Chicago: Second Edition. (Carbondale and 
Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978). 
3 Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago 1940 – 1960. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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He asserts that African American politicians and civic leaders made attempts to 
intervene on their own behalf to help their housing situation but found their efforts to be 
in vain because of deep seeded racism already in place in Chicago.  More importantly, 
Hirsch concludes, black politicians were ineffectual in terms of housing policy because 
they were, more often than not, unable to come to a consensus on a course of action, and 
even more problematic, their agenda was rarely able to get past the agenda of the 
cohesive white “Democratic Machine”.  Generally more self-interested in maintaining 
their seats in office, than pushing for controversial change in housing policy, black 
politicians did not do much to help the dire housing situation that existed in the city.4 
Although Hirsch gives a succinct analysis of the weak role black politicians played in 
bettering the housing conditions of African Americans in Chicago from the period of 
1940-1960, his lack of analysis of the efforts of the greater black population to advance 
their condition reduces African Americans to passive victims who simply withstood their 
conditions and waited for white policy makers to help them.  Evidence reveals that this 
was certainly not the case.   
In a historically ethnographical look at Chicago public housing, sociologist Sudhir 
Alladi Venkatesh evaluates the Robert Taylor Homes with an intimate focus on the 
individuals living in the projects in his work, American Project: The Rise and fall of a 
Modern Ghetto5.  Spending a great deal of time in the housing complex with residents, 
Venkatesh seeks to understand the failings of public housing from the tenant’s point of 
view.  Asserting that tenants came together very early on in project history, first to 
                                                           
4 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 15. 
5 Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, American Project: The Rise and fall of a Modern Ghetto. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000).  
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address issues surrounding juvenile delinquency, he discusses the ways residents 
continued to convene over time to hold the CHA accountable for policing their dangerous 
neighborhoods and for maintaining their deteriorating buildings.  Venkatesh 
acknowledges that while many of these resident groups worked, or at least attempted to 
work, with the CHA, by the 1980’s many had become what we recognize today as street 
gangs that heavily influenced life in Robert Taylor Homes.  His work is a worthwhile 
step towards understanding the importance and influence of tenant groups in public 
housing history but it leaves much to be discovered as it focuses narrowly on Robert 
Taylor Homes.   
Rhonda Y. Williams provides the most in-depth look at tenant lives organizing in 
public housing in her work, The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women’s Struggle 
against Urban Inequality6.  Williams’ monograph focuses more narrowly on gender, 
examining the role black women played in defining policy regarding public housing in 
Baltimore, Maryland.  However, her input is important because it is reminiscent of the 
role of women in tenant organizing in project housing throughout the U.S.  She contends 
that the government sponsorship of housing for poor people, a large percentage of whom 
were women, fostered a political domestic life in which tenants became inherently 
politically savvy.  Although black women were marginalized and often provided no other 
choice but to live in substandard government housing, the conditions in which they 
survived provided them a political platform and a sense of empowerment.  Williams does 
not seem to imply that black women’s efforts at improving their housing conditions were 
                                                           
6 Rhonda Y Williams, The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women’s Struggle against Urban Inequality. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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ever wildly successful, but she does infer that their experience in effectively organizing 
was invaluable to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960’s.  Conducting over fifty 
interviews and tapping into primary sources that gives black single mothers living in 
public housing the credit they deserve for their actions against injustice in housing, 
Williams’ logic and arguments are sound and invariably apply to life in Chicago public 
housing.  William’s work is necessarily important because she is one of the first 
historians to shed light on the fact that many tenant groups were formed and organized by 
woman and mothers who lived in project housing.  This trend was apparent across cities 
throughout the United States.   
Like Rhonda Y. Williams, historian Annelise Orleck seeks to fight back against 
the “welfare queen” stigma of black single mothers in her work, Storming Caesar’s 
Palace: How Black Mothers Fought their Own War on Poverty.7  With Ruby Duncan, 
“cotton picker, turned hotel maid and mother of seven”, as the central figure of her study, 
Orleck evaluates the process in which southern black women began leaving heavy field 
labor jobs in the Mississippi Delta in the 1940’s and traveled to Las Vegas in search of 
more promising work in the American West.8  Facing discrimination in jobs, housing, 
education, and healthcare, black single mothers came together, with Duncan at the helm, 
to form Operation Life.  Operation Life was successful in helping single mothers in Las 
Vegas get access to healthcare, food, and decent housing and their success resounded 
                                                           
7Annelise Orleck, Storming Caesar’s Palace: How Black Single Mothers Fought their Own War on 
Poverty. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005). 
8 Orleck, Storming Caesar’s Palace, 2. 
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throughout the United States and served as an example for other poor people’s 
campaigns.9 
 In his work, When Public Housing was Paradise: Building Community in 
Chicago (2005), historian J.S. Fuerst seeks to understand Chicago public housing’s 
transformation from a promising New Deal inspired social welfare program, to its early 
21st Century Plan for Transformation designed to tear down high rise buildings and 
implement a voucher program.10  Fuerst includes dozens of interviews with individuals 
involved with Chicago public housing from CHA board members and staff to residents 
and maintenance workers.  His abundance of personal stories from public housing 
residents brings to light the importance of the lives of the human beings most effected by 
decisions made by high level management, and gives a voice to highly controversial 
strategies executed by the CHA and city government and the way tenants daily lives were 
affected.11   
Fuerst and several of his subjects speak on the common theme of first CHA 
director, Elizabeth Wood, and her style of governance.  Many discuss the early successes 
of public housing in Chicago, citing the heavy emphasis Wood put on strong 
relationships between the CHA and tenants as an important reason for initial positive 
feedback on the program.  Most seem to agree that never again has the CHA had a 
director who could be considered a champion for tenant’s rights.  Fuerst, as well as 
several others interviewed, mention resident management programs.  Although many 
                                                           
9 Orleck, Storming Caesar’s Palace, 3. 
10 J.S. Fuerst, When Public Housing was Paradise: Building Community in Chicago. (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2005). 
11 Fuerst, When Public Housing was Paradise, 31. 
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were inspired by the government’s willingness to concede power to residents, others felt 
that the CHA was simply handing off responsibilities that they could not handle to a 
group of people who were even more ill-equipped.12  Fuerst alludes to the idea that a 
return to Wood’s paternalistic style of oversight could be the solution to Chicago public 
housing’s problems however, the climate of public housing is much different than it was 
when Wood was director.  Most residents have been resistant to recent efforts by the 
CHA to increase surveillance and oversight.  
D. Bradford Hunt, regarded as one of Chicago public housing history’s foremost 
experts, places the blame on mismanagement at both the federal and local levels, poor 
building construction and management, and flawed admissions policies that led to serious 
problems with juvenile delinquency in his comprehensive work, Blueprint for Disaster: 
The Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing.  He alleges that the first projects were only 
viable for a period of about twenty years for various reasons.  Hunt makes the case, as 
most historians do, that early public housing residents moved in with a feeling of hope 
and saw their new apartments as “paradise” compared to the slums where they previously 
resided.  But as early as the 1950’s, families were being removed from housing projects 
for earning too much money.  The overall decline in income along with gross 
mismanagement at the hands of the CHA, led to the decline and rampant deterioration of 
housing projects across the city of Chicago.13   
                                                           
12 Fuerst, When Public Housing was Paradise, 38. 
13 Bradford D. Hunt, Blueprint for Disaster: The Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing. (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 5. 
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Hunt praises first CHA director Elizabeth Wood’s, director from 1937 – 1954, 
hands-on style of management and cites her governing strategies as one of the reasons 
that public housing was initially successful in Chicago.  Wood emphasized a positive and 
truly interactive working relationship between the CHA and its tenants, and evidence 
shows that although she imposed what some viewed as strict regulations and guidelines 
for project living, most residents were happy to comply and appreciated the attention 
given to their circumstances.  Wood advocated for programs intended to educate low-
income residents on how to better maintain their apartments and emphasized the 
importance of community rather than removing tenants who were causing problems and 
not taking care of their units.  These policies proved unpopular amongst CHA leadership 
and led to her eventual firing and replacement with a series of directors who reached a 
budget mandate by cutting costs and creating maximum occupancy with little 
consideration for CHA-tenant relations.  Hunt addresses the mismanagement of federal 
funds by the CHA and attributes this to the board of directors being unable to ever come 
to effective consensus on housing policy, on top of an element of corruption for which 
Chicago government agencies hold a reputation.  Poorly constructed and dangerous high 
rise buildings continued to deteriorate and the CHA carried on neglecting tenant needs 
throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s.  By the 1980’s, this pattern created an environment 
that lent itself to gang activity, crime, and drug use in public housing projects throughout 
the city.   
Hunt makes an important argument for continual problems in the buildings 
themselves.  He contends that the high-rise buildings created a variety of problems in 
their very layout.  They were built for larger families and the eligibility requirements 
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created a situation where children greatly outnumbered adults, this lack of supervision 
leading to a rise in juvenile delinquency.  He ultimately makes the case that the design 
also made it very difficult to police the buildings, making them even more conducive to 
crime.  High-rise building’s aesthetics were unwelcoming and propagated an atmosphere 
of poverty where the residents perpetuated that mind-set, being constantly aware and 
reminded of the fact that they were living in government projects.  Hunt also makes a 
compelling case for the deeply instilled racism in the city of Chicago during the early and 
mid-nineteenth century that led to the downfall of public housing. Racism was 
institutionalized at all levels which had serious implications for public housing.  Projects 
were purposely built almost solely in black neighborhoods, further enabling the severe 
segregation that already existed and caused so much racial tension in the city.  Hunt 
makes note of the different attempts at resident management made on behalf of the CHA.  
Residents of LeClaire Courts came together in the early 1980s and fought valiantly to get 
the chance to work with the CHA, via HUD funding, as primary managers of their 
housing complex.  LeClaire Courts residents maintained management status from 1989 to 
1995 when it was declared that they had become “ineffective and inefficient”.14  Without 
providing an overwhelming wealth of examples, Hunt describes other efforts on behalf of 
Chicago tenants to organize on their own behalf and their general lack of long-term 
successes.  He attributes their ineffectiveness to underfunding and unwillingness to help 
and mentor resident managers, on the part of the CHA and acknowledges that, had the 
                                                           
14 Hunt, Blueprint for Disaster, 264. 
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CHA and HUD provided more support to tenant organizations, they very well might have 
prospered. 
The topic public housing in America is worthy of continued study.  There are still 
poor Americans in dire need of affordable, decent housing and the promise to provide it 
has yet to be successfully fulfilled by the United States government.  Countless 
historians, sociologists, and journalists have explored the topic from various perspectives, 
but there is still more to consider.  Considering the critical relationship between the CHA 
and its tenants could potentially lead to a better understanding of public housing’s 
breakdown in Chicago, and further better interactions between the two parties in the 
future.   
14 
CHAPTER I  
DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO 
 
Public housing in Chicago has a complicated and emotional history that originates 
in the early 20th Century with the Great Migration when thousands of poor blacks left the 
South between 1910 – 1915 in search of work in Chicago’s steel factories, meat packing 
plants, and binderies.15  The city’s housing projects are infamous for their rapid 
construction and arguably quicker deterioration.  Unsanitary living conditions, 
mismanagement at the hands of the Chicago Housing Authority as well as the federal 
government, increasing poverty due to rising unemployment rates, and overcrowding, all 
emerged as serious problems facing public housing tenants and the CHA as early as the 
1950’s.  Tenants developed a reputation of being poor, unemployed, uneducated, and 
gang affiliated.  A closer look at the history of Chicago public housing reveals the many 
tenants and tenant organizations that were heavily involved in the making of public 
housing policy.  Resident roles do not get enough credit and are overshadowed by the 
major decision making entities like the CHA, the federal government, Mayor Richard J. 
Daley who served as mayor of Chicago from 1955 - 1976.  The important role that 
                                                           
15 Horace R. Cayton and St. Claire Drake, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 58. 
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residents played in Chicago public housing’s history cannot be understood without a 
comprehensive look at the history of public housing in general.    
 The need for public housing in Chicago was great in the mid-20th century as the 
Second Great Migration of the 1940’s and after brought hundreds of thousands of 
southern blacks looking for work in northern cities.  Large metropolises like New York, 
Detroit, and Chicago were booming with jobs to support the war effort.  Beginning with 
the establishment of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) in 1937, supported by the 
Federal Housing Authority, the city was able to construct dozens of high and low-rise 
apartment buildings throughout the city, although most were concentrated on the South 
and West Sides.  All public housing developments constructed in Chicago have been built 
under the auspices of the CHA.  Bowley explains that the CHA, “is a municipal not-for-
profit corporation” and that, “It has a dual purpose (1) to provide safe, decent, sanitary 
housing to poor families and individuals who live in substandard dwellings and cannot 
get adequate housing in the private housing market, and (2) to remove slums and blighted 
areas.”16  Finding land to build public housing proved to be problematic early in the 
process and it quickly became apparent that the easiest solution for legislators was to 
clear out existing slums where the poor already lived, and build housing on those 
locations.   
Race was a key factor in determining where complexes would be built and who 
would be eligible to live in them.  The Ida B. Wells Homes, located in the Bronzeville 
neighborhood of Chicago’s South Side and constructed in 1939, represented the first 
predominately black public housing complex in the city due to the neighborhood 
                                                           
16 Bowley, The Poorhouse, 16-17. 
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composition rule.  The neighborhood composition rule reinforced racial segregation by 
ensuring that the construction of any public housing would not change the existing racial 
makeup of the neighborhood for example, building black housing complexes in already 
established black neighborhoods, a policy supported by the CHA and federal government 
at the time.17  There had been attempts at integration prior to government public housing, 
which were usually failures, by and large.  Whites were unwilling to live in buildings 
with a large black population and furthermore, segregationists did not support this kind of 
integration and put pressure on the city to stop it from happening in the form of protests 
and even riots.  Harold Ickes, Secretary of Interior to President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, oversaw much of the construction of public housing at the federal level.  Ickes 
allowed for the “neighborhood composition rule” as a way to appease anyone who feared 
that the government was forcing integration on the American public and to uphold the 
theory of “separate but equal” when it came to housing and race.  However, as the first 
public housing complexes were being built, the CHA’s director at its inception, Elizabeth 
Wood, pushed for some integration, proving to be a very progressive policy for her time, 
as most all public housing projects in other cities were rigorously segregated.  In an 
attempt to integrate, as well as to allow tenants to have a voice, Wood requested that 
CHA applicants choose the apartments in which they would live.  Responding to the 
1919 Chicago race riot, Wood allowed for applicants of different races to choose the 
apartments in which they preferred to live, finding that the races segregated themselves 
which made for minimum racial tension.18 
                                                           
17 Bowley, The Poorhouse, 24. 
18 Hunt, Blueprint for Disaster, 55. 
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Wood is known for being a progressive leader with visions of integration and a 
strong advocate of good relations between the CHA and its tenants.  She also holds a 
great legacy for being an advocate for the residents of the housing units and for being 
incorruptible in a city where corruption thrived as a means for progress.  She was noted 
for implementing strict rules for CHA residents to maintain building safety and up-keep.  
In the beginning, there were various criticisms of the CHA being overly paternalistic, but 
generally, residents of the housing projects felt as though the rules and regulations were 
for the best, and valued the fact that the city invested so much attention to the well-being 
of their communities.  Wood continually advocated for racial integration within public 
housing, but was often met with adversity by most others involved in the agency who felt 
integration was the source of racially charged violence.  She was eventually pushed out 
of her role as CHA director because her agenda consistently clashed with that of city 
hall’s.  Her exit from the CHA caused a great deal of protest from the black community, 
who viewed her as one of their great supporters.19   
With the allotment of federal funds for the building of housing projects, the CHA 
set out to find building sites throughout the city where the developments could be 
constructed.  A slew of problems resulting in political setbacks arose concerning this 
venture.  The city was unwilling to allow the CHA to build projects on land that was 
undeveloped and urged slum clearance and building in those areas instead.  Finding white 
neighborhoods to build projects in was extremely difficult, as in the case of the Francis 
Cabrini Homes on the Near North Side.  In the early 1940’s, this neighborhood was 
predominantly Italian-American when the CHA proposed the building of the Francis 
                                                           
19 Fuerst, When Public Housing was Paradise, 3-5. 
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Cabrini Homes on the site.  There was a great deal of resistance on the part of the 
residents of the neighborhood to the building of the projects, as well as interest in the 
land from other government departments, such as the highway department.  By the time 
construction got underway in 1941, the CHA had only a small portion of the land on 
which they had originally proposed to build.  Because of this instance, it was made clear 
that slum clearance in white neighborhoods was an extremely difficult and lengthy task 
and that doing so in black neighborhoods in the form of slum clearance proved to be 
much easier.20  The difficulties that arose in attempting to acquire land on which to build 
in more desirable white neighborhoods prompted the CHA to solely seek more easily 
obtainable land in black neighborhoods where land was less developed.  Black 
homeowners in these areas attempted to defend their land from this kind of sweeping 
slum clearance, however they usually lacked the funds or political power to stop the 
building projects.21   
This building pattern is what helped sustain the already existing “Black Belt” in 
Chicago.  Whites had the resources and political power to defend their neighborhoods 
against the building of public housing developments, and blacks simply did not have the 
same influence.  Because of the location of housing projects, it would solidify the racial 
segregation of the buildings and ensure that more blacks were living in public housing 
than any other race.  The implications of race concerning the building of public housing 
had been clearly defined in the city by this time.  During wartime, when projects were 
built in white neighborhoods to temporarily house black war workers and veterans, there 
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were massive protests staged and initiated by the white residents of those neighborhoods.  
The biggest obstacle that the CHA and the city of Chicago routinely faced was figuring 
out how to compromise on where exactly public housing projects would be built, while 
appeasing all involved parties and also residents of the neighborhoods in which they were 
being built.  This proved to be no easy task.   
Proposals to build housing projects in any area with a large concentration of 
whites, or land that was undeveloped, was met with mighty, often violent resistance from 
white residents of those areas.  The CHA’s 1946 policy of allowing returning black war 
veterans to move into public housing buildings in certain white communities prompted 
violent resistance in areas like Trumball Park Homes, Airport Homes, and Fernwood 
Park Homes, all CHA projects.22  In 1951, the National Guard had to be summoned to the 
city after over a span of several nights a mob of nearly five thousand whites in the Cicero 
area ransacked and burned an apartment building with all black residents.23   
Regardless of the controversy surrounding the construction of public housing 
developments, the first public housing residents of the 1940’s and 1950’s moved in with 
a feeling of hope.  The belief that the government had finally stepped in to help the city’s 
poor and provide them with clean and sanitary housing was alive and well, and most 
tenants were thrilled with their apartments. Alex Kotlowitz captured the excitement of a 
woman who moved into Henry Horner Homes, a West Side housing project, with her 
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children for the first time, “They were struck by the apartment’s immensity; the hallway 
seemed to go on forever, one room following another and another and another. What’s 
more, the freshly painted walls shone a glistening white; even the brown linoleum floors 
had a luster to them. The youngest children found the coziness of the door-less closets 
inviting.24” Most CHA residents felt this way about the projects but these feelings of 
hope and excitement were soon replaced with feelings of despair as the poorly 
constructed buildings began to deteriorate not long after residents moved in.  The 1940 
census revealed that over 55,000 units of Chicago housing projects housed more than the 
recommended amount of people and that well over 200,000 either lacked a working 
bathroom or needed extensive repairs.25   
The CHA was wrought with conflict within management, and was quickly 
exposed as a young agency managed by individuals with staunchly opposing views on 
how public housing ought to be managed.  These conflicts within the CHA led to gross 
mismanagement at the ground level, resulting in the tenants being the group suffering the 
most.  CHA staff was unable to handle the amount of complaints coming through their 
offices and leadership had a very difficult time collaborating with city government. This 
lead to a rapid decline in housing conditions and problems emerged with public housing 
that no one predicted.  Insect and rat infestations, broken appliances and elevators, 
cracked ceilings and walls, inferior plumbing and electrical systems were among the 
problems that emerged early on.   
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 The Federal Housing Act of 1937, which provided the majority of funds to the 
CHA, was the first major attempt on the part of the federal government to address the 
housing crisis in America.  There was a shortage of sanitary housing, an abundance of 
sordid slums, and a severe need for government intervention in most major cities in the 
United States.  The idea that the federal government would work with the local 
government to construct public housing, and allot funds for the buildings in order to help 
the city’s poor and despondent, was a noble and necessary one.  Before the Second World 
War, four public housing complexes were built in Chicago.  After the war, during the 
1950’s and 1960’s, the majority of public housing in Chicago was built.  At the onset, 
public housing was developed specifically to meet the needs of the city’s poor, but the 
CHA had to temporarily utilize their housing complexes to accommodate war workers 
and veterans during and after WWII.  This period of time was the most integrated public 
housing complexes in Chicago ever were.  
The Second Great Migration occurred beginning in 1941 with the onset of World 
War II, bringing black workers from the South to Northern industrial cities in search of 
work, which was plentiful.  This provided for a rapid influx of African Americans in the 
city of Chicago in the 1940’s and 1950’s and also put great strain on housing availability.  
Overcrowding became a serious issue.  Racial tension in public housing was at its highest 
shortly after World War II, when the CHA and the city agreed to allow black war 
veterans to live in complexes that were situated in white communities, temporarily 
abandoning the “neighborhood composition rule”.  This rule stated that, “occupants of 
completed projects should conform to the ‘prevailing composition of the surrounding 
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neighborhood’ that existed before its redevelopment.”26    Robert Taylor, director of the 
CHA at the time, used the issue of housing black war workers and veterans as an 
opportunity to exploit the system and construct more housing projects where blacks could 
reside.  Taylor had success in the building of Altgeld Gardens in 1943, on the Far South 
Side, which was further from the “black belt” than most projects that were being 
constructed.  Taylor advocated for the building of several temporary housing projects 
during wartime to cater to black war workers and veterans.  He was routinely met with 
resistance by not only the city government and the white community, but the black 
community as well, which did not want projects being built in their more well-off 
neighborhoods for fear of devaluation of property.  Besides Altgeld Gardens, Taylor saw 
little more success in his ventures to build temporary housing for black war workers and 
veterans. 
 The history construction of public housing in Chicago is wrought with violence.  
As the CHA scouted locations for building sites and legislators and white residents 
pushed back, violent protest emerged as a means for demonstration.  Historian Arnold 
Hirsch discusses the time period of the 1940’s and 1950’s in Chicago, describing it as a 
time of “hidden violence”27  This period was previously believed to be a time of relative 
racial peace in Chicago and other large cities due to a decline in black militancy, 
comparative to the decades preceding and following (the 1930’s and the 1960’s),  but 
Hirsch brilliantly dispels this view, demonstrating the rise in violent crimes committed 
against blacks, regularly over the issue of housing.  As overcrowding in the Black Belt 
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continued to increase, black residents had no choice but to seek housing in other areas of 
the city in which they had not traditionally been able to live.  This led to a spike in 
violence as blacks infiltrated white neighborhoods with the assistance of the CHA as they 
proceeded to build public housing facilities in areas like the far South Side’s Trumbull 
Park Homes, where white residents protested violently against black “intruders”.28  This 
was the sentiment in communities all over the city of Chicago in the early 1940’s. The 
killing of a black teenager by a Chicago policeman in the spring of 1943 and the grand 
jury’s refusal to indict the officer, along with the eruption of the deadly Detroit race riot 
that same spring, ushered in an era of violence in Chicago. Public housing played a 
highly controversial and central role in that violence.29  
 Angela Willuweit, a white resident of Cabrini Green in the 1940’s discusses the 
fact the when her and her husband first lived in the initially integrated projects, a sense of 
community existed and she felt very safe.  Willuweit explains that once the racial quota 
that ensured a racially mixed community in Cabrini was lifted in early the 1950’s, the 
projects became increasingly dangerous.30  She recalled, “My husband worked nights, 
and he came home around two in the morning. He was attacked a couple of times. It 
started getting rougher and rougher in the surrounding area. Every year I felt worse and 
worse, you know. I wanted to move out but we had three boys and the housing was 
scarce.”31 
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 Besides the protests coming from white residents of prospective building areas, 
the Chicago Housing Authority faced a bureaucratic block in furthering their building 
plans.  In 1949 Congress passed the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Housing Act, providing a 
significant amount of funds to be spent on developing public housing complexes 
nationally, including Chicago.  The CHA initially proposed a plan that would build 
40,000 units over several different sites throughout the city.  The city, as well as private 
groups that had power and influence over city hall, rejected the proposal and offered to 
build about 13,000 units on lands that were slum-cleared instead of vacant.  Historian 
Roger Biles explains, the CHA accepted the proposal out of fear that the “perpetual 
stalemate” would halt the project.  When federal approval was given in November 1951, 
the project reformers learned how resistance could seriously jeopardize a “timely 
amelioration of the housing crisis”.32  The CHA, and ultimately the city, now faced the 
problem of having roughly 13,000 units being built where the need for housing was far 
greater than that number.  The building plans provided that slums be cleared rather than 
new land developed, which also did nothing to address the issue of segregation.  Rather, 
it helped to reinforce segregation because the projects were being built in predominantly 
black neighborhoods.   
The CHA has always been the key figure in the development of all public housing 
in Chicago, but the role of Chicago’s city hall plays a very significant role as well.  Some 
Chicago politicians were better than others at working with the CHA utilizing federal 
funds to see that housing projects were actually built.  Arguably, Mayor RJD, 1955-76 
had the most influence and oversaw the most progress in the development of housing 
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projects in the city.  Thousands of units were built between 1949 and 1962, mostly in 
black neighborhoods, with the consent and guidance of Mayor Daley and the CHA’s 
compliance.  Politics has played a very important role in the construction of public 
housing in Chicago.  Although some controversy surrounds the locations in which Mayor 
Daley consented on which public housing was built, it was during his time in office that 
the majority of public housing was built.  Prior to the Daley regime, Mayor Martin 
Kennelly, in office from 1947-1955, was “disinclined to intrude in city council affairs”, 
and “rhetorically supported the attempts of alderman to exclude public housing from their 
wards.”33  This resulted in a minimal amount of public housing developments being 
constructed during Kennelly’s time in office.  Kennelly even spoke out against a bill that 
would have prevented discrimination in public housing at the time.34   
Although a great deal of public housing construction occurred under Daley, many 
argue that Daley purposefully worked to sustain Chicago’s “Black Belt” with his public 
housing plans because it benefited him politically.  Biles states, “For Daley, the use of 
public housing to concentrate the black population in ghettos made sense for several 
reasons; it pleased the liberals, who saw the large-scale construction of public housing as 
a commitment to sheltering the poor; it maintained segregation, which pleased his white 
constituency in the neighborhoods threatened by racial change; and it preserved the 
means by which black votes could be controlled.35”  Daley tried his best to appease both 
sides and ended up perpetuating the racial status quo, rather than addressing the mounting 
racial problems that had begun to surface.  By the end of Daley’s term in office, drugs 
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and gang violence had started to emerge as major problems within public housing 
projects, along with the obvious racial tensions that had always existed.  
Understandably, many Chicagoans felt that Daley did not properly address the 
public housing issues; rather he pacified each side as best he could to provide a 
temporary solution to help ensure his terms in office, without providing any real long-
term solutions.  Projects were built in Bridgeport, where Daley was born and raised, and 
numerous accusations arose claiming that the CHA discouraged blacks from living in 
these homes, and that Daley wanted to keep the Bridgeport Homes white, keeping blacks 
concentrated in the “Black Belt”.  Articles in the Chicago Defender, the foremost black 
daily newspaper at the time, regularly contended that Mayor Daley and the CHA actively 
worked together to maintain the racial status quo of the neighborhoods.  In an article 
published by the Defender on May 14th, 1964, George Weber, director of rentals for the 
CHA at the time, stated “We inform all applicants of vacancies and they make their own 
selections. Most Negros just seem to choose certain Southside areas in preference to 
projects at Division or other sites.”36  Neither the CHA nor Mayor Daley willingly 
admitted to purposefully maintaining segregation within public housing, although it was 
common knowledge that this was the general practice, if for no other reason than to 
maintain peace among blacks and whites during a time when racial tension was high.  
Among blacks in Chicago, it seems to have been the general consensus that Mayor Daley 
was not willing to work for the Civil Rights cause and that the issue of public housing 
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was no exception.  Any attempts at integration that the CHA pursued during his time in 
office, Mayor Daley ultimately put to rest.   
Mayor Daley’s policies of discouraging racial integration were not new to public 
housing in Chicago.  Ultimately, he sought to avoid violence caused by racial tension in 
which he believed racial integration was at the heart of.  It was custom, though, that the 
CHA and city hall had different agendas on the matter of race.  The CHA made the 
decision to support open occupancy in 1953 after the major racial conflict in the Cicero 
neighborhood, yet city hall refused to allow the implementation of these policies because 
of their controversial nature.  A disturbing pattern emerged of blacks moving into public 
housing complexes and whites subsequently moving out making housing projects less 
and less integrated as time went on, until they became almost one hundred per cent 
populated by African Americans around the early to mid-1960’s.  Biles explains that, 
Daley’s administration facilitated this configuration by “fully exploiting federal 
resources”, citing that, “in 1955 when approximately two-thirds of the people residing in 
CHA projects were black, nonwhites constituted 73 percent of the families moving into 
public housing units. By 1959 the proportion of blacks in CHA projects had risen to 85 
percent.”37  Rather than pushing for building projects on undeveloped land, Daley 
allowed for and encouraged slum clearance as a means for rapid construction.   
As important as location of projects is to public housing history, arguably so is 
building design. Historians generally agree that the architectural design of most of the 
public housing in Chicago plays a major part in what led to its downfall.  The high-rise 
design, the CHA’s go-to choice for public housing construction after 1950, has been the 
                                                           
37 Biles, Richard J. Daley, 89. 
 28 
subject of a great deal of criticism.  Historian Devereux Bowley devotes an entire chapter 
of his work to this issue because of its controversial nature.  He acknowledges that the 
high-rise design provided for an increase in the amount of available housing and at the 
same time brought about some of the worst sociological issues for which Chicago public 
housing is known. Some of these issues include juvenile delinquency due to lack of 
supervision, deterioration, and crime due to difficulties policing the buildings.38  Hunt 
also makes note of the dangerous trend of children far outnumbering adults in high-rises 
buildings and the problems that arose.  Because high-rise units often had four or five 
bedrooms, large families were generally among the majority population.  Hunt argues 
that, “When coupled with high-rise building forms, public housing’s youth-adult 
demographics undermined the collective efficacy of adults, caused extensive social 
disorder, overwhelmed community partners, and eventually sent the buildings themselves 
into a death spiral form which the CHA never recovered.39  However, high-rises were 
chosen as the blueprint for public housing because they were cheap to build, and allowed 
for a massive amount of units in buildings that did not take up space by having to spread 
out.  As is evidenced, finding building locations proved to be difficult, and building up 
was a logical solution.  There is a great deal of evidence to support that fact that before, 
during, and after the building of the high-rise structures, the CHA was well aware of the 
negative impacts for individuals and families who lived in these structures, but their 
attempts at trying to push for row-housing as an alternative, were stifled by the federal 
government who were ultimately funding the building of the projects.  Even Mayor Daley 
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lobbied in Washington DC against building so many high-rise public housing in Chicago, 
knowing the kinds of dangers involved, such as juvenile delinquency, and difficulty 
maintaining building upkeep.  Compromises had to be made that proved to be 
detrimental.40  For example, in order to cut costs, in the Robert Taylor Homes, in one 
building there were two elevators to accommodate almost one thousand residents.41 
Monsignor John Egan, director of Chicago archdiocesan Office of Urban Affairs in the 
1950’s, reflected in 1985 on the negative of the Cabrini-Green project: 
When Cabrini Extension was being planned in the 1950’s, it seemed like a good 
idea. The people who planned it were high-minded people who wanted to put up 
decent housing, and, for a number of reasons, high-rises seemed to be the way to 
go. The problem is, we didn’t learn from our mistakes. We should have stopped 
the massive high-rise developments as soon as we saw what was going wrong in 
Cabrini. But we didn’t. We kept doing it over and over again. The city has paid a 
price for that, and it will continue to pay a price for all the social, psychological, 
familial and human problems that come with packing a very large number of very 
poor people into one small space.42 
CHA and city planners were aware of the issues that might come with the high-rise 
developments, but for lack of a better plan, or option, they proceeded to build these kinds 
of projects all throughout the city.  The CHA pushed on building high-rise apartments 
until the federal government stopped funding the construction of this style of building in 
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1968.  Bowley reports, “During the period from 1957 to 1968, the CHA completed 
15,591 family units, of which all but 696 were in high-rise buildings.”43 
Safety and sanitation issues with high-rise buildings themselves, coupled with 
high racial tensions, the culture of the low-income individuals living in the projects, and 
an increased apathy on behalf of the city and the CHA, bred an environment of violence, 
drug prevalence, juvenile delinquency, and gang activity, that quickly deteriorated the 
public housing communities that were meant to provide families with a sense of hope and 
new beginnings.  The sense of community that existed in the early days of public housing 
disappeared quickly.  Starting with the hostility surrounding the Civil Rights Movement 
of the 1960’s and carrying over into the hasty introduction of drugs into project 
communities in the 1980’s, public housing complexes earned their reputation as 
dangerous places.  Names like Robert Taylor and Cabrini Green became synonymous 
with crime and violence.  On March 16th, 1986, the Chicago Tribune printed an article 
about a 22-year old Cabrini Green resident, who was murdered during a dispute over 
drugs: “Police said Wallace went to the Greenview Avenue location reportedly to 
purchase drugs but became involved in an argument with the seller.  Wallace then drove 
back to Cabrini Green where he enlisted the aid of up to four other men. They returned to 
the neighborhood where gunshots were fired and Wallace was killed, police said.”44  Into 
the 1970’s and 1980’s the crime, drug, gang, and violence situation in public housing 
units in Chicago only worsened.  This particular article was only a paragraph long, which 
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helps demonstrate the lack of sensitivity and the commonplace of these occurrences by 
the 1980’s on the part of mainstream media publications like the Chicago Tribune.  
Another article in the Chicago Tribune discusses how gang violence and crime had 
become a part of daily life for most people living in the Robert Taylor Homes.  “When 
asked to write compositions about their daily lives, children attending the nearby 
Beethoven Elementary School write almost exclusively about gangs and drugs.  Of 
eighteen 6th graders asked to write spur of the moment accounts of their lives Friday, 
sixteen students mentioned crime.”45 Residents of public housing began to learn how to 
live and survive in this type of environment at an early age. 
An incident that took place in May of 1988 highlighted the stark differences 
between the lives of children living in the Chicago suburbs and the Chicago public 
housing projects.  On May 20th, a deranged woman went into an elementary school in the 
affluent neighborhood of Winnetka, IL and shot and killed several students.  Two days 
later on May 22nd, nine-year old Alonzo Campbell was walking outside his building in 
Henry Horner Homes where he was shot and killed by a bullet intended for someone else.  
The community of Winnetka mobilized to help the neighborhood school cope with the 
tragedy.  The students were provided counseling, and the governor rallied for more 
security in the school.  But at Henry Horner, there were no counselors for the children, 
and no extra security was called for; the murder was part of life as usual.46  Many Henry 
Horner residents believed that only reason Alonzo Campbell’s murder received press 
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coverage was because it exposed the stark differences between how the Chicago area and 
press treated the two communities.47   
Alex Kotlowitz’s 1991 journalistic ethnography, There Are No Children Here, 
provided one of the first detailed looks into what daily life in Chicago public housing was 
really like for its residents.  Kotlowitz spent two years starting in 1985, tracking the lives 
of two young brothers, Lafayette and Pharaoh Rivers, and their family who were 
residents of Chicago’s Henry Horner Homes.  This compelling book not only helped to 
shed light on what was going on in public housing at the time, but provided an in-depth 
personal story that newspaper articles and statistics did not offer.  The Rivers boys, 
friends with the murdered Alonzo Campbell, had lived their whole lives in public 
housing, along with their mother who had also spent the majority of her life in public 
housing.  Both boys were intelligent and good-hearted, with the desire to do well in 
school and make their mother proud, but often fell victim to their circumstances and were 
sucked into the project lifestyle, despite trying to avoid it as best they knew how.  They 
regularly saw their friends and family members murdered and each boy attended 
numerous funerals before the age of thirteen. Their drug addicted and alcoholic father 
moved in and out of their home throughout their childhoods.  Their older brother, whom 
they looked up to as a father figure, ended up in prison for a term of years for armed 
robbery. Their mother, LaJoe, the most constant figure in their lives, did her best to care 
for them on the welfare check that she received, subsidizing it with money she earned 
gambling.  Their single family apartment often housed nearly triple its suggested 
occupancy due to family members who needed places to stay temporarily at different 
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times.  The boys took all of these situations in stride and adapted to these strange 
scenarios, almost too easily.   
For the rest of their lives, Lafayette and Pharoah dealt with the ramifications of 
growing up in this type of environment; each struggled to finish high school and each 
man endured incarceration during their adult lives.  The Chicago Tribune, reported in 
2011 that both men were parolees, Pharoah for a drug-related conviction, and Lafayette 
on separate drug, druken-driving, and handgun possession charges. Lafayette lived on the 
South Side and worked in a laundry, while Pharoah regularly joined Kotlowitz for 
speaking engagements regarding the book.  Kotlowitz and Pharoah remained close, 
Pharoah even being a part of the author’s 1993 wedding.48  Neither of the boys could 
fully escape the lifestyle of the projects, despite the exposure to the world outside of 
public housing to which Kotlowitz was able to expose them.  Both boys were able to 
travel the country with Kotlowtiz to help promote the book and see parts of the United 
States they may not have if they would not have been involved in the project, but their 
lives remained mostly unchanged from those experiences.  Many historians agree that 
Kotlowitz’s book was groundbreaking in beginning efforts to fix the problems that were 
abundant in Chicago’s public housing communities, however, nothing about the Rivers 
boy’s story is unique for children who grew up in Chicago public housing.  The question 
is, how did public housing in Chicago go from being communities filled with hope for the 
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future, to communities that the residents themselves feared for their lives in on a daily 
basis?  
Racial discrimination led to most of the segregation and subsequent deterioration 
in public housing.  Not only was the public housing situation in Chicago’s “Black Belt” 
harrowing, but barriers to obtaining housing outside that area, like restrictive covenants 
(legal contracts that allowed landlords refuse to rent or sell to blacks), existed allowing 
houses to be sold to African Americans in many neighborhoods.  J.S. Fuerst provides 
insight into the deterioration of public housing by providing first-hand accounts of people 
who lived in public housing in the early days and then continued to live there throughout 
their life, rather than leaving.  Many of these people felt that managerial abandonment 
was a primary of the reason for the decline of public housing.49 The CHA under Elizabeth 
Wood called for a great deal of responsibility on behalf of the residents to maintain their 
apartments and their buildings.  As the screening process for families living in public 
housing became less strenuous and the CHA provided increasingly less oversight for the 
upkeep of buildings, rapid deterioration occurred.   
Most of the residents who have lived in public housing from its onset throughout 
their old age agree that with more intervention on behalf of the CHA, the projects could 
possibly be transformed back to the state they were when they were first constructed.  
Hattie Calvin, a resident of Cabrini Green since childhood, noted, “To bring Cabrini back 
to what it was, you would have to clear out about a fourth of the families who live here. If 
the CHA would come in and do what they were supposed to do and move the 
undesirables out, the project would be in a condition where they wouldn’t have to knock 
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it down.”50  Each person interviewed by Fuerst, who had decided to remain in the 
projects, spoke on a common theme of where they believed the CHA went wrong.  They 
required less screening for families moving in, which brought a number of people into the 
communities who brought with them drugs and gang activity, which led to public 
housing’s ultimate demise in many cases.  Each individual discussed the importance of 
the community and how over the years, this sense of community was broken down due to 
the failings of the CHA and the residents who were allowed into public housing.   
One major reason for this was the decline of monthly income, in general, for most 
public housing tenants.  Management budgets were based on residual fees paid for by 
tenant incomes, and as these incomes declined, so did the budgets for upkeep.51  The 
CHA attempted to offset this trend by switching from first-come first-serve selection to 
an income-based selection process.  As a result, families with higher incomes were more 
able to afford the newer public housing developments and poorer families were banished 
to the older projects, where upkeep was less of a priority.52 In general though, the CHA 
had an increasingly difficult time effectively utilizing money in the budget for the 
maintenance causing continued deterioration.  The new regulations for eligibility based 
on income began to cause the same kinds of segregation among tenants along class lines 
as race had in public housing’s earlier days.   
 Throughout the late 1980’s and 1990’s, different government agencies attempted 
to fix the serious and mounting problems that faced public housing in Chicago.  The 
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) took over the operations 
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of the Chicago Housing Authority in 1995.53 The CHA was viewed by most as a slum-
lord with little to no control over its properties, and little concern, for that matter.  By this 
time, many public housing developments were under the authority of street gangs and a 
large percentage of the populations dealt with drug and alcohol addiction, as well as 
unemployment and widespread poverty.  The CHA continuously tried to make efforts to 
alleviate the problems faced by residents in their communities.  These efforts included a 
proposal in the late 1980’s that attempted to determine whether HUD should take over 
the CHA’s dealings, whether the conditions of the buildings could ever be restored to 
what they were when originally constructed, and also if the city and the police could 
successfully take back control of public housing developments where gangs were the 
authority.54   
HUD ultimately did take over most CHA dealings, although the city of Chicago 
worked to regain control of the CHA eventually.  After HUD’s takeover, one of the 
agency’s main priorities was to tear down high-rise buildings where crime and gang 
activity were most prevalent and make a return to detached dwellings, which were easier 
to maintain and where, historically, residents felt and were, safer.  During the Reagan 
Administration, Section 8 housing, where government funding was provided to private 
property owners to rent to low-income families, was favored although there were not a 
great deal of budget cuts made to HUD.55  Other avenues for alleviating management 
burdens were explored by government agencies, like resident management, in the late 
1970’s.  After acknowledgment of the successes of certain resident management groups, 
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HUD and the CHA even allowed for residents to take control of their housing projects 
with funding and support from the government for a period of time.  
 As gangs and drugs became heavy influences in public housing developments in 
the late 1980’s and 1990’s, attempts were made to halt these problems as well.  Vincent 
Lane, who became director of the CHA in 1987, felt it necessary to return to the 
“paternalistic” ways of Elizabeth Wood in an effort to restore order and authority in the 
projects.56  He called for frequent sweeps of apartments and an enforcement of a curfew.  
This was seen as highly controversial and referred to by the residents as an invasion of 
privacy.  Due to corruption, gang members were often tipped off as to when the sweeps 
would occur and would clear out before the police could conduct raids.  There was a 
consistent push and pull between residents, who felt that these kinds of practices were 
unconstitutional, and other residents and members of the community who felt that they 
were necessary in order to fix major issues faced in the projects. 57  
Efforts on behalf of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and Lane were 
overwhelmingly unsuccessful in seeing any substantial decline in crime or gang activity 
in public housing.  Lane continuously tried to work with the CPD, but corruption 
persisted, as well as the overwhelming authority of gang leaders by this time.  A July 
1988 article in the Chicago Tribune explains, Lane met with CHA managers to try to and 
address the issue of corruption among managers: “The emotions were very high among 
the managers that attended because of a statement he (Lane) had made saying the 
managers of some developments had working relations with street gangs and drug 
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dealers,’ the source said… Lane made the gang and drug charges last week, after a 
proposed major revamping of the problem-plagued CHA. The plan would reshuffle the 
managers of 19 of the agency’s 23 developments.” 58  Lane made continuous attempts to 
fight corruption within the CHA and rid the projects of the gang leadership that 
controlled most of the projects and residents activities.  Despite his noble attempts, he 
failed to make so much as a dent in the problems that the public housing developments 
faced.   
 The final conclusion by the CHA and HUD was that the high-rise buildings 
needed to be torn down, which is exactly what happened in the 1990’s.  No attempt at 
curbing the various issues that plagued public housing developments had been successful.  
Only the fact remained that row-housing complexes were in much better condition than 
high-rises and that the high-rise developments needed to be torn down and replaced with 
row-housing.  One of the greatest issues with this plan was where to house all of the 
displaced residents who could not be accommodated without the high-rise style 
apartments.  Mayor Richard M. Daley took back the reigns of the CHA under his 
administration and proposed his “Plan for Transformation” of public housing in Chicago, 
which included the demolition of high-rise complexes.59    
Daley’s plan worked in conjunction with Washington D.C.’s plan called HOPE 
VI, which is similarly a return to the way public housing was managed in its beginnings.  
This meant a more rigorous process to determine eligibility in an attempt to bring in more 
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working class families to balance the amount of welfare recipients, and setting higher 
standard for maintaining public housing units for residents that resided in them.60  The 
plan called for relocating residents of these public housing units to other neighborhoods 
in the city and the state of Illinois, as well as redeveloping the land on which the 
buildings had been torn down.  The re-evaluation of the eligibility process for residents of 
the new complexes that were to be built in order to integrate the homes with a mixture of 
races and classes.   The part of HOPE VI the allowed housing authorities to establish 
separate housing for the elderly and disabled was a progressive and necessary step for 
public housing.  However, HUD Secretary at the time, Jack Kemp, discouraged parts of 
the legislation that perpetuated the difficulties for the country’s poor in obtaining Federal 
Housing Authority Mortgage loans, a problem that persists today.61  The consensus 
between all government authorities and residents, who had worked to re-establish public 
housing in Chicago as a viable and worthwhile option for housing, was that there must be 
a return to public housing’s core values and ideals.  Government needed to be better 
involved as managers of public housing, complexes must be viewed and treated as 
communities, residents should be held accountable for a good deal of upkeep and 
maintenance, and there must be open communication between management and residents.  
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CHAPTER II  
TENANT ORGANIZING 
 
 Resident activism is an essential component to understanding how Chicago public 
housing changed in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  Many cultural groups in the city, like poor 
ethnic whites and Mexican Americans, experienced similar difficulties obtaining decent 
housing, however, African Americans were the group most specifically targeted by 
property owners, landlords, and eventually the CHA in terms of discrimination and racist 
housing practices.  Due to their long standing battle with marginalization and
mistreatment in most all aspects of their lives, blacks were familiar with the idea of 
needing to organize to fight against racist practices, most notably in the fight for equality 
in the workplace beginning in the 1940’s.  This struggle is evidenced in important works 
like A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue: The 
Depression Decade, by historian Harvard Sitkoff, as well as The Unsteady March: The 
Rise and Decline of Racial Inequality in America, by historians Philip A. Klinker and 
Rogers M. Smith.62  Convening on the issue of housing was no exception.  Before the 
existence of public housing, blacks in Chicago neighborhoods regularly worked together 
to help one another find decent housing as well as for other reasons like seeking passage 
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of laws against restrictive covenants, contracts that allowed landlords and property 
owners to explicitly not rent or sell to African Americans, in which they were ultimately 
successful.  Public housing and the right to a decent place to live became yet another 
issue for which blacks in America fought.  As informal resident groups continuously 
effected meaningful change over the span of several decades, government agencies began 
to formally recognize and fund particular groups.  Many tenant management 
organizations saw a great deal of success during their tenure however, none have lasted 
into the present day, mostly due to a lack of funding and support.  To understand public 
housing’s history, resident activity must be evaluated and considered as a key factor in 
project housing policy’s development.   
  Segregation and race are at the forefront of the reasons why housing in Chicago 
specifically has been so troubling.  Even prior to the construction of public housing 
complexes in Chicago, there was a tendency for the black community to organize around 
the issue of housing.  The formation of the Black Belt, aided by the use of restrictive 
covenants by property owners, as well as the powerful push back from white residents to 
neighborhoods to which blacks sought to move, prompted discussion of the serious need 
for housing for black Chicagoans.  The deadly Chicago Race Riot of 1919 further 
indicated the intense division between the races, with housing often being at the center of 
the discussion.  Because of the resistance from whites to allowing blacks into their 
neighborhoods, the Black Belt became remarkably overcrowded.   
Choosing to focus on the Bronzeville area, a thriving all black South Side 
Chicago neighborhood, historians Horace R. Cayton and St. Clair Drake analyzed the 
area as a microcosm for the greater black society in Chicago.  Their work is considered a 
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prolific and landmark study of black migration to Chicago in the 1940’s and its effects on 
city overall.  In the 1940’s Bronzeville was where black business, churches, and culture 
thrived the most in the period leading up to World War II and after and it served as an 
example of greater black community organizing in the city as a whole.  The authors 
analyze the important role of churches in the black community for organizing and fund-
raising purposes.  The church was the foremost institution for individuals to organize and 
fundraise, even if they were not necessarily religious. Cayton and Drake state, 
“Bronzeville’s churches are centers of entertainment as well as worship,” and also 
allowed, “Large masses of people to function in an organized group, to compete for 
prestige, to be elected to office, and to exercise power and control.”63  
 Beyond the church, blacks in Bronzeville regularly came together in social clubs.  
Some of these clubs were merely for the purpose of socializing and entertainment, but 
others acted with intention to “advance the race”.  This included helping black business 
thrive, bringing culture to the community, and assisting individuals with needs that were 
not being met because of lack of job opportunity and education.  Drake and Cayton 
define “advancing the race” as, “creating conditions under which lower-class traits will 
eventually disappear and something approaching middle class way of life will prevail.”64 
They describe an instance where a man living in Bronzeville expressed displeasure with 
the amount of his rent, “He doesn’t blame the Negro doctor from whom he rents, because 
he believes that all rents in Bronzeville are “rigged”. He wonders why the Government 
doesn’t build more projects, ‘because if anybody’s gonna be fair to the colored people, 
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you’d think it would be the Government.’”65  Drake and Cayton provide a compelling 
analysis of how class plays a leading role within the issue of race.  The need for blacks to 
come together in order to effect change seems to be at the root of their solution for what 
would uplift the black community.  However, divisions among the upper and lower 
classes are what kept the black race at odds.  Leaders of the black race were most often 
times upper class individuals who did not share the same goals as the lower class.  This 
point is further emphasized on the issue of housing where the authors concluded, 
“Competition for space is a basic ecological process which, in a city where race and 
ethnic segregation occurs, is interpreted by nearly everyone as a competition between 
ethnic groups”.66 The severe overcrowding of the Black Belt and subsequent 
encroachment of blacks into white neighborhoods compounded the race issues in 
Chicago.  Drake and Cayton note: 
In 1910 there were no communities [in Chicago] in which Negroes were over 61 
per cent of the population. More than two-thirds of the Negroes lived in areas less 
than 50 per cent Negro, and a third lived in areas less than 10 per cent Negro. By 
1920, 87 per cent of the Negroes lived in areas over half Negro in composition. A 
decade later 90 percent were in districts of 50 per cent or more Negro 
concentration. Almost two-thirds (63 per cent) lived where the concentration was 
from 90 to 99 per cent Negro!67 
The authors attribute the rapid growth of the Black Belt to white resistance to blacks 
moving into predominately white neighborhoods, whether by legal or violent means.   
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 The solution to this problem was government-funded public housing.  The early 
days of public housing promised to provide decent housing and a new chance at life for 
those who were living in the slums of Chicago.  With the introduction of the Federal 
Housing Act of 1937, public housing construction got under way.  The Chicago Housing 
Authority oversaw all construction of housing projects and served as landlords to all 
tenants living in CHA buildings from that point forward.  Understanding the relationship 
between the CHA and its residents is vital to making sense of public housing legislation.  
Under the progressive guidance of Elizabeth Wood, first director of the CHA, tenants 
were encouraged to speak directly with CHA staff to voice their concerns.   
During this era, the CHA generally reacted accordingly and the staff very best to 
meet tenant needs.  Wood oversaw the building of several early housing projects and staff 
members who worked under her fondly remember her commitment to bettering the lives 
of the individuals living in CHA buildings and her strong emphasis on family.  Although 
Wood was the source of much criticism from her peers at the time, today her governing 
tactics are much more highly praised as being the reason early CHA programs were more 
successful. Wood was committed to running the CHA as an agency that truly served the 
people it promised to uplift.  Former colleague, Emil Hirsch, recalled that the issue of 
public housing, “‘was not just a brick and mortar thing’, and that, ‘she was very 
determined to try to get any kind of resource into a project to help the family life and help 
these people who were living there.”68  In explaining her communication style Hirsch 
noted, “Elizabeth had ongoing communication with the people in citizen’s organization 
and church groups that had an interest in or, as she felt, should have an interest in the 
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whole public housing program. She constantly built on that.”69  A solid foundation for a 
respectful relationship between the CHA and its residents was of the upmost importance, 
with satisfied tenants at the core of Wood’s vision.   
 Elizabeth Wood is an important figure in CHA history, therefore her background 
is worth exploring.  She was born in Japan, but raised in Bloomington, Illinois where she 
eventually went on to study biology at Illinois Wesleyan University in 1916.70  Receiving 
both a BA and an MA in Education from the University of Michigan, Wood spent time 
teaching before moving on to a career in the social welfare field.71  Throughout the 
1930’s Wood worked various jobs in agencies that worked closely with New Deal 
programs that sought to provide relief for Americans that desperately needed housing and 
other assistance.  From 1934 to 1937 she served simultaneously as the first executive 
director of the Metropolitan Housing Council and the executive secretary of the Illinois 
State Housing Board where she assisted in composing the legislation that established the 
CHA in 1937.72  This wealth of experience of the field of housing is what prompted her 
election as first director of the CHA. 
 Many cite Wood and her term, 1937-1954, as director of the CHA as the only 
time in Chicago public housing’s history that tenant and CHA relations were relatively 
peaceful.  However, there were still thousands of Chicagoans, most notably black, who 
were displaced due to the CHA’s inability to house every person in need.  In the 
immediate postwar period, whites in Chicago were greatly affected by the housing 
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shortage and being that whites were most often given priority in housing in general, this 
crisis left blacks that much more desperate for places to live.  Predominantly black 
neighborhoods became increasingly more crowded and dangerous.  Thousands of blacks 
from the South continued moving to Chicago in the postwar period looking for work that 
was still readily available, yet with no housing to accommodate their arrival.   
Black communities saw a rise in fatalities due to dangerous living conditions.  For 
example, there was a spark in deadly apartment fires due to the grave state of affairs.  Not 
only were fires a problem because of dangerous living conditions, but that Chicago 
landlords were notorious for setting fires themselves in an effort to collect insurance 
money; usually a more lucrative tactic than obtaining what little rent they could from 
their low-income tenants.73  In May, 1941, 8-year old Albert Brown, home alone at night 
with his siblings, managed to rescue three of his four younger brothers from their burning 
Southside apartment. Neighbors struggled to hold him back from returning into the 
burning apartment and rescuing his baby brother because he had been in the building for 
a dangerously long time and the flames had begun to take over.  Firemen finally arrived 
and retrieved the baby, getting him to the hospital, but his injuries were fatal.  
Investigators found that an overheated coal stove’s flames reached nearby clothing and 
caught fire, causing the apartment to burn down.74  Albert had been babysitting for his 
parents and it is difficult to imagine the kind of guilt felt by Albert and his parents alike.  
Albeit heartbreaking, these kinds of incidents were hardly isolated, especially in Black 
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Belt houses and apartments where landlords were known for not maintaining their 
property.  The Chicago Defender reported this incident while the Chicago Tribune makes 
no mention of the tragedy. Another deadly fire in October 1947, killed six children and 
four women in an apartment on Chicago’s West Side.  A jury found the landlord totally at 
fault for the deaths of these individuals because his complete disregard for apartment 
safety and proper maintenance is what caused the fire.  Neglecting to take the jury’s 
recommendation, the city made no progress in improving housing regulations at that 
time.75   
As management became more difficult for the CHA due to budget constraints, 
disagreements between board members, physical deterioration of their ill-constructed 
buildings, and unhappy tenants, other options for managing tenant concerns needed to be 
explored.  Many felt that Wood’s style of oversight was overly paternalistic.  Others felt 
it was necessary in order to maintain the integrity and property of public housing 
complexes.  As public housing continued to grow as a mechanism and the CHA became 
increasingly unable to handle all tenant issues and concerns, resident management was an 
obvious next step, as many tenants had begun to organize effectively on their own 
already.  Most residents felt empowered by responsibilities given to them through tenant 
management efforts, rather than allowing a board of directors at the CHA make decisions 
on their behalf when, in fact, those individuals where wholly unaware of what it was like 
to actually live in project housing communities.  Many CHA members agreed that 
implementing tenant management programs was a positive idea, with the belief that 
residents, due to their physical closer proximity to the issues, more than any other 
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deciding body, knew better on what to spend government dollars in their specific 
buildings and communities. 
With so many common issues facing public housing residents in Chicago, it 
makes sense that those with similar problems living in such close proximity came 
together to address their concerns and seek solutions.  Before the Chicago Housing 
Authority (CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began 
to support policy that funded tenant management programs in public housing projects in 
Chicago and across the country in the late 1970’s, residents frequently and effectively 
came together to solve daily problems they faced that the CHA could not, or would, not 
sort out, beginning at public housing’s inception.  Residents volunteered to take shifts 
watching and policing dangerous hallways to make buildings more secure they took it 
upon themselves to make sure the grounds were well-kept and held one and other 
responsible for proper maintenance.  Tenants, on their own accord, created babysitting 
and after-school care programs to help curb juvenile delinquency.  Public housing 
residents in neighborhoods all over the city of Chicago took it upon themselves to 
become resident managers on their own, effecting major change in their communities, 
long before the federal government or the CHA sanctioned these efforts.   
Throughout the 1960’s, residents of public housing complexes often worked with 
agencies outside of the CHA in order to get their needs met.  The Clarence Darrow 
Community Center located nearby the Leclarie Courts projects opened under the 
leadership of Irene Smith, a well-known Leclaire Courts resident leader and activist, in 
early 1960 with the hopes of providing assistance to underprivileged children in the 
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neighborhood.76  The Chicago Tribune reported that nearly twenty thousand people 
received services from the center every year ranging from education, social, to 
recreational assistance.  Sports clubs, dances, and vocational classes were among the 
many services provided.77  In a project neighborhood where children often went 
unsupervised because their parents worked either two jobs or irregular hours, these kinds 
of programs were vital to curbing juvenile delinquency.  Rita Lewis-Perry, former 
Leclaire Courts resident, fondly remembers the Clarence Darrow Center as a part of her 
childhood, “Through my adolescence, Leclaire was generally a pretty decent place to 
live. There were always community things going on. They had the Leclaire Community 
Center, and they used to have the schools open in the evenings. I remember going there 
and skating in the gym, playing pool, tennis, Ping-Pong. The kids had a place to go where 
there was adult supervision and they could be off the streets.”78   
Like the Leclaire Courts tenants, the residents of Robert Taylor Homes (RTH) 
first came together to address the issue of the copious numbers of unsupervised children 
living in the complex, without anywhere to play.  This was troublesome because it left a 
large number of children playing outside, either on the one available playground on the 
property, the alleys and train tracks near the building, or worst of all, the frequently non-
working elevators that had proven more than once to be deadly.  Elevators were used like 
amusement park rides for children living in the complex and being that by 1970, seventy-
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five per cent of RTH elevators were out of commission, they were of top concern for 
parents.79  Eddie Leman, former resident of Robert Taylor Homes from 1968-1982 recalls 
the dangers of the elevators: 
Even when the elevators were working, the lights were out half the time. They 
used to call them death traps. People got their arms or their body caught up in 
there. The elevator closed tight, like a clamp. You’d have to hold it with both 
hands and try to open the door if it was shutting. There was no safety sensor. 
People were routinely stuck, hurt, trapped in there. They had on red button bell in 
there to ring, but that didn’t do anything. The only way to open the elevator safely 
was to use this long six-inch key. It was like a stick and you’d open the elevator 
with that, but those keys weren’t never around, so you’d have to pry yourself out 
And when you climb out, you’ve got to jump down or climb up. You’d be stuck 
between floors. You get on the elevator, you risk getting stuck, you risk getting 
hurt, you risk getting robbed. And I lived in the fifteenth floor, so you know I had 
my exercise on.80  
Venkatesh notes that the, “CHA formed ‘elevator committees’ consisting of ‘volunteer 
mothers’ who would operate the elevators during periods of heavy use,” to help curb 
some of the dangerous activity on the machines.81 Beyond the numerous children that had 
been injured on the elevators, as well as reported deaths, paramedics were unable to reach 
individuals on top floors in need of treatment because of the non-working elevators.82   
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Truancy and juvenile delinquency were quickly becoming a problem in RTH and 
public housing complexes throughout Chicago in the 1960’s. With the majority of parents 
working varieties of shifts, it was difficult to monitor children at all times.  Single parent 
homes, usually headed by mothers, dominated public housing complexes.  These single 
mothers were often unable to attend to their children after school and during their work 
hours.  Parents of RTH attempted to resolve issues via communication with the CHA and 
initially concerned mothers sought help from the agency through phone calls, meetings, 
and letters.  The dynamic between the CHA and residents in the early 1960’s was 
seemingly peaceful and the residents were able to voice their concerns to an empathetic 
agency that generally expressed its desire to assist as best it could.  Residents were able 
to call CHA management offices to voice concerns and meetings were held (or promised 
to be held) where tenants could have open dialogue with CHA staff.   
Although interaction between the CHA and residents at this time was seemingly 
peaceful, little was usually done to effect real change.  Small offices with individuals that 
existed worked as liaisons for resident concerns responsible for thousands of residents, 
making it very difficult to be available to any one individual’s needs.83  Because of the 
difficulties that RTH parents met in trying to create a better environment for their 
children with the help of the CHA, a groups of mothers came together and called 
themselves “Mamas Mafias”.  Their purpose was to monitor each other’s children while 
others were at work to deter children from getting swept up in gang activity, provide 
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counseling services, and to serve as general neighborhood watch groups.84  Ottie Davis, 
who grew up in RTH in the 1960’s, describes his mother’s “Mafia”, 
What made Robert Taylor better back then? People was more together. If I saw 
your kid out, nine or ten o’clock at night, I’m taking his ass home! And I knew 
better to call my neighbors a liar. Nine or ten o’clock at night, I better not be 
downstairs. I lived on the fourteenth floor. My range was the thirteenth and 
fourteenth floor, and I better not get past it. And sometimes it was just the 
fourteenth floor. So I got the whole fourteenth floor to roam and I cross that 
fourteenth floor, go in the hallways or the elevator and my mother not with me, 
she gonna call my neighbor and that neighbor gonna kick my ass all the way back 
to the fourteenth, and I gonna get another ass-whupping ‘cause my mother will be 
waiting at the fourteenth floor.”85  
“Mama’s Mafias” existed in different RTH buildings and managed to help increase 
security in dangerous hallways that were beginning to be taken over by gangs and other 
criminal activity.  These informal support networks, some evolved into formal 
organizations, were essential to resident life and safety in RTH, as well as other Chicago 
public housing projects throughout the city.   
Avenues for communication between the CHA and residents were still only just 
being established in the early 1960’s, because there was hardly a precedent to follow.  
Early public housing residents understood that voicing their concerns, and seeing 
solutions carried out, was going to be a difficult task.  This politically inexperienced 
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group had a confusing, stubborn, and often unresponsive bureaucracy to navigate if any 
progress were going to be made. 
Into the 1960’s and 1970’s, the CHA witnessed surges in applicants and 
individuals in need of immediate housing as recessions hit the United States economy 
and unemployment and homelessness reverberated throughout the city.  With this 
increase in demand, the CHA became increasingly lax in its requirements for occupancy 
and began allowing more welfare families into public housing, prompting many working 
class families to move out and seek housing outside of project homes.  Public housing 
was becoming less about helping working class families find affordable and decent 
housing, and more about housing the city’s most poor individuals.  Chicago public 
housing became increasingly poor, overcrowded, and disproportionately African 
American.  The already strained relationship between the CHA and tenant organizations 
was further irritated by this trend, offset by the fact that the CHA was progressively less 
able to address tenant concerns.  All of this compounded by indifference on the part of 
the city government and widespread mismanagement and corruption amongst CHA 
leadership.    
 As public housing projects began to physically deteriorate throughout the city due 
to their poor and rapid construction, as well as the failure of the CHA to address tenant 
needs and their inability to maintain their buildings properly, residents inevitably became 
less satisfied with their living conditions and more prone to organizing around the issue 
of their right to decent housing.  The Building Council system was put into place by the 
CHA in the early 1960’s as a way to establish more formal communication between the 
agency and residents who showed leadership capabilities.  Individuals, most often older 
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females, were either appointed or elected by the CHA and building tenants to be on the 
Building Council and represent their building.86  Venkatesh reports that RTH residents 
recalled that, “Elections were not ubiquitous, and the process of determining membership 
was not systematic. Not all tenants participated or perceived the councils to be an 
important collective voice. In any building, a tenant might be self-appointed as a council 
president or appointed informally by other tenants or by a CHA staffer who had observed 
her leadership in other venues; residents typically volunteered to be floor representatives, 
but they may also have been chosen by the existing council president.”87  Venkatesh 
explains the Building Council, more commonly known as Local Advisory Councils, 
election process: 
In each housing development, tenants within a building would elect a “building 
president” to a Local Advisory Council, the board that offered input into the 
CHA’s policies for that complex. And in each development, tenants would also 
elect a separate “LAC president” who would sit on Chicago’s Central Advisory 
Council (CAC), the board made up of the LAC presidents of each public housing 
complex across the city. The president of the CAC would actually be a board 
member of the Housing Authority with full privileges to attend meetings of the 
CHA Board of Commissioners and vote on budgetary and management 
decisions.88 
The CHA created the Building Council system as a hierarchical organization, appointing 
residents based on a display of aptitude towards leadership, assigning the lowest level 
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elected or appointed members to menial tasks like cleaning and scheduling the use of the 
building’s laundry facilities. The higher level members existed to delegate tasks and the 
top level council members worked with the CHA and Building Councils of other public 
housing projects to cooperate on social services projects to benefit all project residents.89 
 Most public housing residents of the 1960’s have positive things to say about the 
Local Advisory Council (LAC) system and the benefits it provided for their daily life.  
Developments with council members that exhibited strong and effective leadership skills 
recall the various benefits they received from this system.  Council members were able to 
contact CHA managers directly to repairs done to apartments that may have previously 
been put off indefinitely.  There were also perks of being a council member.  Edna 
Harris, council president in RTH in the 1960’s recalls, “Our apartments was always the 
first taken care of, ‘cause we’d just call up managers and they knew to make sure we was 
happy or else we could make their lives hell.”90  Harris explained that residents 
understood the power that building council members had and if a building was well taken 
care of, it meant that their building council managed effectively and was to be 
respected.91   
However, not all building councils were as effective.  Paulina Collins, who was a 
resident of several RTH buildings throughout the 1960’s noted the difference between 
strong and weak resident leadership under the LAC system: 
We here [at the 205 building] have always been kinda funny, you know, kinda 
different than 210 or 218… We had Ms. Walton [a Building Council president] 
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fighting for us for thirty years now. Right from the start, when the CHA wouldn’t 
pay [this part of the housing development] no attention, Ms. Walton made sure 
that we’d had gardens, our lobbies ain’t had no piss all over them, we’d had our 
trash picked up, our apartments was real nice… so, no, I don’t have no complaints 
about raising my family in Taylor. But maybe that’s because I did it in this 
building and not in some of the others [close by].92 
Because of the varying successes of Building Councils throughout public housing 
developments in the city, this system remained as an avenue for communication between 
residents and the CHA until formal resident management programs came into effect in 
the late 1980’s. 
It is important to note that Chicago public housing resident management groups, 
formal and informal, were often not terribly diverse.  They were commonly African-
African, female-dominated organizations.  The bulk of public housing families were 
headed by single parents, most often mothers.  The weight of daily project living often 
fell on the women living in those projects, motivating social clubs that frequently evolved 
into informal resident management groups.  In her intensive study of black women’s 
history in public housing in Baltimore, Maryland, historian Rhonda Y. Williams states, 
“The federal government’s subsidy of low-rent housing implied a right to decent living 
conditions for U.S. citizens. From the beginning, this implied right highlighted poor 
people’s low citizenship status and politicized groups of tenants. For poor women, in 
particular, subsidized housing created a sense that the previously private sphere of home 
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had become public and political space.”93  In other words, government being at the center 
of project living, even providing guidelines and rules for daily life was the catalyst for 
politicizing black women living in the projects.   
Due to their sometimes daily interaction with government agencies, women 
across the United States living in public housing became very familiar with public policy 
and the ways to navigate bureaucracy. The value of the work that women were doing in 
public housing complexes across the nation was clear.  There was a natural progression 
from informal groups that met to delegate such tasks as trash duty in the hallways, 
babysitting, and gardening to name a few, to a transition into government sanctioned 
resident management organizations.  Many events occurred within this transition, and 
many individuals fought hard in order for residents to have a political voice in policy that 
effected them so directly.  The forces behind this movement certainly were not entirely 
female, but the resident management movement was without a doubt female driven.   
For example, Delores Wilson, an African American woman and long-time 
resident of Cabrini Green beginning in 1958, described her time living there and 
participating in tenant management programs.  Her husband worked as head janitor of an 
entire complex, 1230 N. Burling, allowing them to live there without paying rent, an 
obvious perk of participating in the program. Her husband was a well-respected man and 
most people treated the building with respect during his tenure as head janitor, she 
recalls. After his unexpected passing in 1981, Delores took on the role as President of the 
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Building Council for ten years, also placing her on the Local Advisory Council and 
official tenant management program.94 Wilson explains,  
Every building had a Building Council but in the late eighties, the residents of 
1230 N. Burling started taking resident management courses. We pulled together 
and handled everything except the electricity and plumbing. The residents had 
jobs – work order clerk, janitors, maintenance men, secretary, treasurer, 
everything. We even collected the rent. Eventually our building was rehabbed 
after we went into resident management. I believe 1230 N. Burling was the first 
building in Cabrini Green that went into resident management. The first President 
Bush, Daddy Bush, named us “a model for the nation.” We met with Jack Kemp 
and then Henry Cisneros in Washington, D.C. And our building was incorporated 
in 1992.95 
Delores Wilson’s husband had worked and been paid by the CHA as head janitor of their 
building and acted as a manager long before federal funds were provided for him to do 
so.  Delores stepped up as Building Council President, as did hundreds women living in 
public housing complexes across the United States.   
 Although most tenant organizers were black women, owing to the fact that public 
housing residents were disproportionately populated by African Americans, white women 
living in project housing also tended to get involved in tenant groups.  Irene Smith, long-
time white resident of LeClaire Courts, was a well-respected tenant organizer in Chicago.   
She earned her position as head of resident management at LeClaire and actively worked 
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to better tenants lives through education and job aid programs.  Smith worked closely 
with a nearby social service organization, the Clarence Darrow Center, to create 
programs that benefited the community, like the local thrift shop.  Providing affordable 
clothing and household items, as well as jobs for individuals in the community, the thrift 
shop afforded LeClaire Courts residents opportunities to thrive in their neighborhood 
where those opportunities did not previously exist.  Smith sat on the women’s board that 
created the thrift shop and helped provide other necessary services to neighborhood 
residents. 96  She was regularly recognized for her unrelenting efforts to bring desperately 
needed social services to the LeClaire Courts community.  The Chicago Tribune 
regularly reported on Smith and the work that she did for public housing, while failing to 
report on important black figures like the notable Chicago Housing Tenant’s 
Organization (CHTO).  At the ten year celebration of the Clarence Darrow Center in May 
1963, Smith was honored as being at the center of “helping in daily solution of personal, 
social, and family problems confronting residents”.97 Smith relied on her diligent 
volunteer staff of women and mothers to facilitate her work as director.  Activists like 
Delores Wilson and Irene Smith were hired by the CHA to work in their complexes and 
paid for their duties, however most resident activists worked on a volunteer basis.  
Stories regarding the women of LeClaire Courts and Delores Wilson’s, help 
challenge the contention that public housing residents were complacent victims, willing 
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to not only accept their circumstances, but to actively aid in making them worse by being 
lazy and prone to crime and violence.  Digging deeper into the more well-known 
historical conversation of black activism centered on the 1960’s era Civil Rights 
Movement, an underappreciated story of black women fighting for basic housing needs 
emerges.  Many assert that the changes effected by ground level tenant management 
groups were unremarkable because they did not produce sweeping change across the 
board.  Truer to reality is the fact that even without grand scale change in public policy, 
informal tenant management groups created a great deal of positive change in the daily 
lives of many residents.   
In early 1968, the CHA sought more inclusive policies for residents who so 
clearly desired, and were capable of management responsibilities.  Appropriating them 
the title of ombudsmen, the CHA began the process of hiring nearly 200 residents to 
work in their respective buildings in a variety of jobs ranging from janitorial work, to 
being part of the welcoming committee for new residents to foster a sense of community 
between residents.  In 1969 G.W. Master, CHA Director of Management explained to the 
Chicago Tribune that, “For too long the CHA has been playing ‘big brother’ to its 
145,000 residents of its 1,100 buildings. We are dealing with people, not items. When 
people are grouped together, they usually form a neighborhood or some sort of social 
order. This has not always occurred in the 37 years of CHA’s history. So we are out to 
encourage the residents to help create their own neighborhood.”98  The article goes on to 
explain the assorted jobs hired residents were to take on.  A Cabrini Green resident made 
                                                           




clear that the program stemmed from the ideas of residents asserting their skills and 
abilities as managers, rather than coming down from CHA thought and leadership.  He 
explained that many residents were fearful that if they made their complaints known to 
CHA staff, they would be removed from their buildings, which is why residents began 
handling building concerns on their own in the first place.  The CHA, refuting this claim, 
stated that all complaints were anonymous and that fear of eviction was unnecessary.  
Dollars appropriated from the federal government were provided to the CHA at this time 
to conduct wide spread building updates and repairs and also to implement programs of 
this kind.99 
By the 1970’s, the notion that resident involvement in housing decisions, along 
with the understanding that residents were capable of management responsibilities, was 
in full-force, not only amongst residents, but many liberal policymakers as well.  
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society had inspired many Americans to fight for 
their basic rights at citizens, and housing was no exception.  “Resurrection City”, an 
extension of the 1968 Poor People’s Campaign, was a shanty town of more than three 
thousand individuals that created a temporary settlement outside of the Lincoln Memorial 
in the spring of that year.  Historian Annelise Orleck remarks, “They were determined to 
show that they could care for the poor more effectively than the so-called experts; that, in 
the words of a group of welfare activists from Nevada, some of whom were among the 
crowds in Resurrection City, ‘We can do it and do it better’”.100  
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 Responding to the political environment of the times and to the efforts made by 
residents to create an atmosphere of cooperation between themselves and the CHA, the 
agency began making more valiant attempts to allow residents management organizations 
to be included in public housing policy decision making.  They did this by including 
established resident leaders in policy meetings and discussions.  This was a return to first 
CHA director Elizabeth Wood’s style of governance and residents were initially hopeful 
towards the thought of a more hands on role in CHA policy making.  Meeting together to 
decide on varying resolutions for the first time in many years, the CHA and resident 
managers of multifarious housing projects convened in 1970 to address the topic of 
tenant management cooperation with the housing authority.  The motion made known 
that, “Elected tenant councils have no desire to ‘take over the operations of the CHA’ but 
that it is the ‘overall opinion that neither management nor the public housing community 
can work effectively together where there is distrust.”101  This statement was in direct 
contrast with the Chicago Housing Tenants Organization’s (CHTO) agenda.  The CHTO, 
one of the most powerful tenant organizations in Chicago at the time, was actively 
seeking a direct decision making role within the CHA, one that would allow them part of 
the financial control of housing funds.   
 Other tenant groups sought to effect change on a grander scale, beyond their 
individual buildings.  In May 1971, an article in the Chicago Defender, informed the 
public that the (CHTO) was preparing to hold an election that upcoming July to create 
                                                           






new resident councils in the CHA. The sitting CHA advisory council allowed the 
elections as a sign of democratic faith.  The incumbents were members of the existing 
council.  The article states: 
The CHTO has been working for a year on means to guarantee that the 165,000 
residents of CHA projects have a voice in housing policies, and has finally gotten 
the means – in the form of a veto power over the CHA’s intended expenditure of 
over $8 million dollars in federal modernization funds.102 
The veto power that the CHTO sought would allow resident council members the power 
to veto decisions regarding the federal dollars allotted for money that was to go directly 
to update severely in need public housing complexes, money that the CHA often found 
loopholes to spend on other ventures.  The article goes on to explain that the overall goal 
of these elections was to ensure that tenants were finally afforded political power in 
decision making in public housing matters.  In an article published by the Defender a day 
before the election, it is explained that the CHTO members seeking to replace the sitting 
advisory council were individuals representing all nineteen of the city’s housing 
projects.103 A hard earned victory ensued after the elections when the CHTO won a clear 
majority of the CHA advisory council seats.  A small number of the sitting advisory 
board retained their seats.  Although their leader, Jerome Hunt, was defeated, and their 
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majority did not ensure cooperation, it was an obvious sign that tenant power was real 
and effective not only on the ground level but politically.104   
 The CHTO is cited as the first truly politically effective tenant body in Chicago.  
Formed in 1970 as a collaboration of activists groups, the CHTO sought to work together 
as CHA insiders in order to have a tangible say in policy-making regarding public 
housing.105  Demanding improvements in public housing projects like daycare centers, 
and recreation halls where community members could congregate and develop jobs 
programs, the organization was systematically shut out of CHA decision making and 
financial control.  Turning to HUD for support, the CHTO was able to win an election 
securing them voting rights within the CHA, transporting them from an informal tenant 
management group to a politically viable organization.106  Both the Chicago Tribune and 
the Chicago Defender reported on these vital elections, however the Chicago Tribune 
reported a much more positive image of the CHA and a less desirable image of the 
CHTO and their intentions. 
  In yet another example of tenants seeking management power due to substandard 
living conditions and the residents’ belief that they, themselves, could better manage their 
property, tenants of the Jane Addams Homes, located on the West Side, came up with a 
solution of their own.  In March 1973, tenant representatives proposed the idea to the 
CHA of leasing the entire project complex from them in an effort to gain control of the 
project.  Although some tenants feared conditions would worsen without CHA oversight, 
a majority were very interested in the idea.  The CHA, although never admitting to 
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seriously considering the idea, did disclose that they were, “entirely neutral on the idea of 
leasing,” this was until, “a specific proposal is presented and until all tenants have been 
heard from.”107  
Again, these kinds of incidents were hardly isolated.  In November 1975, 
residents of ABLA Homes, a CHA development made up of four different complexes 
including the Jane Adams Homes, Robert Brooks Homes, Loomis Courts, and Grace 
Abbott Homes, joined forces to protest new leases being enforced by HUD.  These leases 
left the CHA with discretion to make any necessary changes that were unfair to residents 
or favored management however, the CHA opted not to make any changes.  The reason 
for protest, as it frequently was, came down to the issue of building maintenance.  The 
new leases allowed for repairs to be made within a ‘reasonable amount of time’.  This 
vague language left the time allotted for repairs to be made to already deteriorating 
buildings open to even further interpretation, likely leading to further decline in 
conditions.  The CHA acknowledged that it would take residents suggestions into 
consideration, but it is unclear whether their efforts were successful this time.  
Prior to being chosen to participate in a HUD pilot program (to be discussed in 
the next section), in which select public housing complexes around the country were 
chosen to be given resident management status and provided direct federal funds for an 
allotted period of time, Leclaire Courts residents of their South-West Side neighborhood, 
had formed several tenant organizations to address resident needs.  This is, in fact, a 
                                                           





primary reason why they were chosen for participation in the program.  Irene Johnson, 
Leclaire Courts resident management president in 1989, had spent six years in her 
crusade to get the CHA to allow resident management status to the complex, prior to 
being accepted to HUD’s program.108  Leclaire Courts was an ideal candidate to 
transition into the program because of the established tenant management organizations 
already in place.  Working with an established local social service agency, the Clarence 
Darrow Center, Leclaire Courts residents created various programs to aid troubled youth 
in the neighborhood.   Residents of Leclaire Courts faced a particularly difficult obstacle 
in that they lived in a highly diverse neighborhood.  Their housing complex was located 
in a largely all white neighborhood.  It was essential that residents of the project came 
together to uplift each other because white residents of the community regularly 
organized around the issue of excluding LeClaire Courts families from community 
activities, especially black youth.   
LeClaire Courts residents not only came together on the issue of juvenile 
delinquency, but they sought to aid adult tenants in becoming skilled members of the 
workforce.  For example, in 1969, using what little resources they had, resident leaders 
created a program that taught women living in the complex how to type.  In order to fund 
the program the women who wanted to participate made and sold jewelry from old 
marbles.  A Chicago Tribune article provides insight into the project saying: “The only 
materials needed for the project are clear marbles of varying colors, jewelry mountings 
                                                           





such as keychains, or cufflinks, a little heat, and a glass of cold water. “The task is fun 
and the product is bright, but the goal is serious,” the coordinator said.  Money from sale 
of the jewelry will be used to rent typewriters.”109  By the late 1960’s, the CHA had 
begun to provide less and less funding in the way of social services for residents due to 
budget constraints and general lack of resources.  CHA money desperately needed to be 
spent on building maintenance and upkeep, and social service programs often fell to the 
wayside.  It was not uncommon for residents, like those of Leclaire Courts, to come up 
with ways to fund projects like these on their own.  Early CHA leaders had visions of 
implementing programs like this that helped its residents become more skilled and find 
jobs however, these plans were thwarted by lack of funding and support, the need for 
focus on the most basic of resident needs, and sometimes overall apathy.  Public housing 
residents throughout the city of Chicago took it upon themselves to implement these sorts 
of programs.   
 The various successes that informal resident management groups achieved in 
Chicago and other cities throughout the United States, prompted the federal government 
to strongly consider and begin working towards building federally endorsed tenant 
management programs by the 1980’s.  For decades, residents had attempted to display 
their skills and abilities to the appropriate government bodies in order to put themselves 
in a place to be considered for management roles and to be the allotted fair and necessary 
funding to make their programs that much more successful.  
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CHAPTER III  
GOVERNMENT SANCTIONED TENANT MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
 
Unmistakably, tenants were not always successful in their efforts to organize and 
have a voice.  Often, tenant management groups were at odds among themselves over 
how to most effectively address their issues.  Most tenant groups recognized the need to 
work directly with government agencies to see their demands met.  The Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), 
were also regularly in disagreement over the role that tenant managers were to play in 
decision making; HUD endorsing more tangible tenant power and the CHA envisioning 
tenant management roles as more advisory than one of concrete authority.  Regardless of 
their opposing views, each agency, recognizing the increasing power tenant organizations 
had gained, as well as the many benefits of turning management power over the hands of 
public housing residents both began considering ways to include tenants in decision 
making regarding public housing policy.
HUD has seemingly always supported the idea of resident management programs, 
although it did not begin funding them directly until well into the 1980’s.  Assessing what 
little progress had been made in the way of tenant management on behalf of public 
housing authorities across the nation, the federal government felt it was time it intervene 
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and work directly with resident management groups, sidestepping local housing 
authorities in an unprecedented way.  HUD’s mission states: 
HUD’s mission is to create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality 
affordable homes for all. HUD is working to strengthen the housing market to 
bolster the economy and protect consumers; meet the need for quality affordable 
rental homes; utilize housing as a platform for improving quality of life; build 
inclusive and sustainable communities free from discrimination, and transform the 
way HUD does business.110 
Twice the word inclusion is used, but is inclusion of residents really reflected in HUD 
policy and action?  HUD cites 1971 as the first year of formal resident management 
incorporation in public housing.  It was the year residents of the Bromley-Heath housing 
complex in Boston came together to address mismanagement and maintenance issues.111 
At the time when Bromley-Heath residents came together, Jack Kemp was Secretary of 
HUD and well-known for his endorsement of resident management programs.  Kemp was 
quick to encourage collaboration between their organizations.  A series of other official 
requests by resident management organizations in public housing projects in different 
parts of the country almost immediately followed, seeking partnership with HUD.  These 
events seemed to finally spark the federal government to take into consideration policy 
that would allow residents control of funds and direct oversight of their respective 
housing complexes.   
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 Pressure from HUD to increase the amount of tenant participation in management 
in 1971 prompted the CHA to create the Local Advisory Council (LAC) system, an idea 
stemming from the Building Council system.  The LAC system was designed to make 
resident managers a more meaningful part of management and decision making.  The 
CHTO was essential in the creation of this system, working closely with HUD to make 
sure their role within the organization was no longer just symbolic, but one that allowed 
them actual decision making authority.112  The tense relationships between public 
housing resident management groups, namely the CHTO and its CHA director at the time 
Charles Swibel, are evidenced in the 1971 election held by CHA occupants in an effort to 
appoint over 2,000 residents to the tenant advisory council of the CHA.  Part of the 
agreement that led to the creation of the LAC system was that elections were held that 
placed residents on their respective LAC’s.113   
This election was the first of its kind in CHA history, allowing residents access to 
CHA decision making on issues such as the budget and building maintenance policies.  
Although the idea of resident cooperation with the CHA was headed by public housing 
resident leaders, the CHA’s cooperation with the elections was an undeniable great step 
toward further tenant management programs.  The election was postponed indefinitely in 
late 1970 because all parties were unable to agree on the role the tenant advisory board 
was set to play within the CHA.  HUD and the CHTO felt that resident advisors should 
be afforded a more substantial say in CHA decision making, while the CHA and current 
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tenant board were satisfied with the advisory role currently held.114  Finally, in July 1971 
a platform for the elections was agreed upon by all parties, and the election was set to be 
held.  Eligible CHA residents were to elect 916 tenant advisors to 19 CHA tenant 
councils.  These councils were set to have a say in the $8.2 million dollars that had been 
on hold for nearly a year, allotted for modernizing Chicago public housing projects.115 
This was the first time that the CHA was actively relinquishing any sort of real decision 
making and financial power to public housing tenants, rather than appeasing them with 
their previously held inconsequential advisory role.   
HUD continued its attempts to intervene in the dire public housing circumstances 
in Chicago throughout the 1970’s and into the 1980’s however, the Reagan 
Administration halted much of the progress and funding for public housing programs 
across the country.116 Enacting “market solution for urban problems”, Reagan sanctioned 
heavy tax cuts and emphasized private sector solutions and housing vouchers as a 
solution.117  These cuts were what many considered, “a wholesale abandonment of 
cities,” on behalf of the federal government. To make matters worse, it later came to light 
that HUD, under the Reagan Administration, was rigging the housing bidding process by 
awarding housing funds to supporters of the Republican Party and Reagan’s campaign.  
Besides scandals occurring within HUD, housing trends in general in the United States 
were declining in the 1980’s.  Homeownership was down, availability of affordable 
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housing had declined, and quality of available housing was poor, on top of rising costs in 
rent and the federal government’s response was to cut housing assistance policies by 
nearly seventy five per cent.118  Political Scientists Charles Moore and Patricia A. Hoban-
Moore explained at that time, “While the percentage of the population that is poor has 
grown from 11 to 15 per cent (and is now above 13 per cent) during the 1980’s, overall 
budget authority at HUD fell from $36 billion in 1980 to $15 billion in 1989, the largest 
drop of any federal department.”119  
These destructive policies ensured minimal progress for public housing in the 
1980’s.  Once again, the residents of public housing developments across the country 
were of last priority.  But with the CHA in disarray itself, President Reagan sent a HUD 
advisor to the city in 1982, tasked with the firing of the entire board of the CHA and 
realigning its leadership in an effort to overhaul corrupt staff members.120 HUD made 
these demands at the expense of providing federal funding to the CHA until they were 
met.  CHA director, Charles Swibel, and Chicago mayor at the time, Jane Bryne, pushed 
back in an attempt to maintain control over the agency, claiming HUD’s demands were in 
line with Reagan’s attempt to reduce federal support for public housing across the board.  
The agencies finally agreed that the unpopular CHA director could retain his position for 
the next ninety days and the CHA board was expanded to allow for more members.121  
The ultimate agreement among HUD, the CHA, and Bryne in this dispute was reflective 
of greater public housing policy at the time; government entities squabbled over 
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bureaucratic nuances, disregarding the wants and needs of residents, at the expense of 
residents who had to live with their decisions.     
In a 1992 executive summary submitted to HUD’s board of directors and the 
Office of Policy Development and Research, “Evaluation of Resident Management in 
Public Housing”, researchers documented their findings on the history and effectiveness 
of resident management programs in the United States, after federal policy was enacted 
and tenants had spent a worthwhile amount of time engaged in the programs.  HUD had 
decided to provide its stamp of approval on government sanctioned resident management 
programs with intentions of evaluating their effectiveness compared to the efficiency of 
their respective city’s public housing authority.  Residents of public housing complexes 
throughout the United States had been lobbying since 1987 for the chance to participate 
in a federally funded resident management program and were finally successful in 
securing support.   
 The purpose for federal backing of resident management programs was to gain 
insight as to whether residents could more successfully manage building maintenance and 
upkeep and immediate tenant concerns than their respective city’s housing authority.  A 
wide variety of services fell under these categories.  Public housing complexes all over 
the country were deteriorating and most residents were unhappy with their unsanitary and 
often dangerous living conditions, a plight not at all exclusive to Chicago public housing.  
Up until the 1970’s, most housing authorities were unable to handle the volume of 
complaints and issues brought to them by residents.  Putting the financial and decision 
making power to address these changes into the hands of tenants was an obvious next 
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step, as tenants had begun forming groups, fundraising, and taking care of problems in 
their respective units on their own for several years.  
 The Housing Act of 1937 was amended in 1987 to include resident management 
programs and to begin funding Resident Management Corporations (RMC’s) throughout 
the country as soon as possible. Leclaire Courts was Chicago’s site chosen for 
participation in HUD’s program as a full-service RMC, meaning that residents were in 
charge of building maintenance as well as financial responsibilities (managing-agent 
RMC’s were generally only help responsible for building maintenance and left out of any 
financial affairs).122  Cites chosen to be full-service were given that distinction because of 
volatile history with their city’s housing authority as well as some kind of an established 
history of tenant organizing.  These sites, Leclaire Courts being no exception, also 
generally needed extensive rehabilitation of their building infrastructure.123  The report 
recognized residents of Leclaire as formal participants in tenant management affairs as of 
1973 in the form of their Local Advisory Council (LAC), although informal styles of 
tenant management had been going on for some time.   
 Conceding the CHA as a housing authority wrought with corruption and highly 
“troubled”, the study points out the revolving door of CHA directors and continuous 
mismanagement of funds.  The CHA, at that time, was in full support of resident 
management programs and was working with several other housing projects besides 
Leclaire Courts on development of programs.  Representatives from each department of 
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the CHA came together to form a group that worked for the purpose of assisting resident 
management groups in a first step towards having a successful program.124 
 Leclaire Courts residents were the first public housing residents granted full 
tenant management status in Chicago, coming together in 1983 to request this distinction 
and being granted RMC status by 1987 under HUD’s resident management funding 
program. The board was provided with nearly $1 million dollars and an extensive training 
program to get its appointed board and staff members prepared to manage.  The resident 
managers put a great emphasis on their desire to receive extensive training prior to taking 
over, as their aim was to make their program as successful as possible. The United Way 
and other local organizations agreed to provide this necessary training.  By 1989, the 
Leclaire Courts RMC was fully operating on its own, with the option to request 
assistance from the CHA if there were issues beyond their capabilities.125 
 As previously acknowledged, the Leclaire Courts RMC worked closely with the 
Clarence Darrow Center (CDC), a nonprofit organization that had been based in the 
Leclaire neighborhood since the early 1950’s, providing social services to community 
members.  The RMC worked with the CDC, allowing it to continue to provide many of 
the social services it had been affording because it was a well-established organization in 
the community.  These social services included daycare programs, after-school programs, 
food, and employment programs.  Allowing the CDC to continue to head these programs 
meant that the RMC was able to devote its time and funds to other vital concerns in the 
housing project like building maintenance. 126  This is unique to many other RMC’s that 
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lacked a social service partnership and needed to devote larger portions of their time and 
budget to social services.  
 The Leclaire Courts RMC board, like the other full-service RMC’s evaluated, had 
committees for the oversight of maintenance; personnel and grievances; social services 
and economic development; financing and fundraising; redevelopment and rehabilitation; 
training; and planning.127 There were board members, paid staff, and volunteers who 
carried out all decisions that were made.  Leclaire Courts had CHA staff members on the 
payroll for a time to help ease the transition into managing on their own; out of 35 RMC 
staff members, 23 were actual residents at the time of the study.128   
The study breaks down the responsibility of staff into seven different categories: 
personnel; resident screening; lease enforcement; financial management; security; 
property management; and procurement.  Leclaire Courts’ RMC was responsible for all 
management functions with the exception of income certification of residents and billing 
duties at this time.129 It was typical that most RMC’s left billing up to their local housing 
authority.  
 The study then evaluated the effectiveness of the various RMC’s put in place.  
Their success was assessed by looking at outcomes of each public housing authority, 
barring any work done by the participating RMC, and then evaluating the performance of 
cooperating RMCs.  The performance indicators were as follows: work order processing; 
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maintenance staffing; annual HQS inspection; resident turnovers; vacancy rates; resident 
recertification; and tenant accounts receivable.130 
In contrast to all other participating RMC’s, Leclaire Courts underperformed its 
public housing authority (PHA) in respect to work order processing, but the study 
attributes this to the extensive backlog the CHA had, compared to other public housing 
authorities in the program.  In all other categories, RMC’s either performed as well or 
better than their corresponding PHA, including Leclaire Courts, regardless of the fact that 
its staff was tasked with taking the reins of the PHA that was considered to be in the 
worst shape of all PHAs in the program.131  Leclaire Courts significantly outperformed 
the CHA in annual unit inspection rates at seventy-seven percent with the CHA 
inspecting only thirty four percent.  By the end of the study, Leclaire Courts saw a one 
percent vacancy rate, while the greater CHA had a vacancy rate of sixteen percent132  
With the exception of the subgroup, tenant accounts receivable, the Leclaire Courts RMC 
outperformed or did as well as the CHA. 
It is also worth noting that the Leclaire Courts RMC spent significantly less on 
maintenance in general per unit, as well as administrative costs, than did the CHA 
throughout the duration of this program, as they continued to outperform them in most 
evaluated categories.    
 Ultimately, this important HUD research project found that, in general, residents 
surveyed at the completion of the program on a variety of categories were more satisfied 
with RMC run housing complexes than with complexes controlled by PHA’s.  
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Researchers concluded that RMC’s were beneficial in that they: built strong 
communities; nurtured future leaders; equipped residents with necessary skills; and 
helped develop a solid working relationship with the PHA.133 
The survey indicates HUD’s desire for future support of RMC programs.  So why, 
when the program was so seemingly successful, did the federal government and CHA 
cease sponsoring programs like this one?  HUD has continued to sponsor different kinds 
of tenant management efforts and initiatives, providing millions of dollars of funds to 
RMC’s around the country, but there has been no formal sweeping policy or HUD funded 
wide-scale evaluation of resident management programs since the report in 1992 of 
HUD’s collaboration with PHA’s to implement and support RMC systems.   
 Resident management exists formally today in what is known as The Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968, or Section 3, although it is not what resident 
management looked like in its previous form. Section 3 seeks to provide jobs and training 
to public housing residents within their housing projects.  More specifically it is,  
HUD’s policy for providing preference for new employment, training, and 
contracting opportunities created from the usage of covered HUD funds to low- 
and very low-income residents of the community where certain funds are spent 
(regardless of race or gender), and the businesses that substantially employ these 
persons.134 
It provides the opportunity for public housing tenants to hold a variety of jobs in their 
complexes, several leaning towards tenant management responsibilities.   Some of these 
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jobs include payroll, work order processing, janitorial work, drywall construction, 
landscaping, and many more.  Residents must go through a thorough screening process 
and meet a set of eligibility guidelines in order to be able to obtain these jobs.   
 Not surprisingly, the CHA has been cited for failing to comply with Section 3 
guidelines and not appropriating the program’s funds to the hiring of resident’s to 
available jobs.  In January 2012, HUD released their findings that the CHA had not 
complied with Section 3 regulations exposing the fact that “from 2008 to 2010 CHA did 
not award any Section 3 covered contracts to ‘Section 3 business concerns’.”135  Resident 
complaints that low-income tenants were not being awarded jobs sparked the HUD 
investigation into CHA practices.  By March 2013, the CHA and HUD came up with a 
voluntary compliance agreement that the CHA would begin hiring low-income residents 
for positions, as intended by Section 3, under the strict supervision of HUD.  The CHA is 
no stranger to having to hand its leadership over to HUD.  Section 3 also states that at 
least $200,000 in funding are to be spent each on “economic development” for each 
project.  Most interpret this to mean that these funds are meant to be used on creating jobs 
and helping individuals find existing jobs.  However, there are contingencies that allow 
for these funds to be accounted for under the category of “economic development” so 
long as they are spent on “housing construction, demolition, rehabilitation, or other 
public construction (i.e., roads, sewers, community centers, etc.”136  This provides a 
possible explanation for one way that the CHA has found a work around for hiring 
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residents.  With further oversight from HUD, there is hope that residents of Chicago 
public housing will continue to be a part of managing their buildings, as they have proved 



























PUBLIC HOUSING IN NEW YORK: WHERE CHICAGO WENT WRONG 
 
Public housing in the United States is considered a failure, by and large.  
However, other cities ventures into public housing were not quite as disastrous as 
Chicago’s.  Sadly, Chicago public housing tells arguably the worst version of public 
housing’s history in the United States.  Other cities, like New York, saw greater success 
with the program for reasons unique to that city.  Analyzing the history of New York City 
(NYC) public housing allows for a comparative look between public housing programs 
and insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the housing authorities of both NYC and 
Chicago.  Other factors beyond each city’s housing authority have contributed to 
successes and failures in NYC and Chicago as well.  Factors like race and segregation, 
and major differences in each city’s local government’s interworkings led to variations in 
public housing between Chicago and NYC.  One thing remains constant though, each city 
saw a wealth of public housing tenants coming together to fight for better living 
conditions and make their voice heard in a system where policy maker decisions 
dominated their daily lives.   
A comparative evaluation of New York City (NYC) allows for a greater 
understanding of Chicago’s failings.  New York City is known for having fairly decent, 
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well-maintained public housing complexes that provided countless residents with 
affordable living spaces.  Many attribute the success of NYC’s public housing to its 
commitment to dedicated management, starting with the New York City Housing 
Authority (NYCHA), down to its well-incorporated system of tenant management.  
Managers of the NYCHA are trained and expected to maintain an emphasis on building 
maintenance, stressing the importance of making sure tenants are at least safe in their 
environments.   
 Historian Nicholas Dagan Bloom speaks of his experience visiting NYCHA 
buildings in all five New York boroughs:    
The results of this watchfulness are evident today. I have found well-maintained 
brick buildings, mature plane trees and green lawns, active community and 
recreation programs, and first-class play equipment. Developments also 
frequently adjoin city parts and public transportation. During the day these public 
housing developments have significant numbers of staff cutting grass, fixing 
elevators, cleaning graffiti, and collecting trash.137 
The picture Bloom paints of NYCHA housing projects in the early 2000’s is a far cry 
from circumstances in the majority of Chicago public housing developments.   
 Bloom further highlights the important role administrators of public housing 
placed in competent and involved management.  He attributes their understanding of the 
importance of this to the fact that prior to the construction of public housing, New York 
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had long operated with “multi-family housing”.  Having experienced rapid population 
growth and a desperate need for housing, complexes built to house many large families 
had been in existence for decades in the city and provided a wealth of experience for 
policy makers.  Bloom cites the most important element of the experience New York 
housing administrators had acquired was the understanding that strong management was 
key to sustainable housing. He contends that other housing authorities, namely the CHA, 
operated under the assumption that simply constructing buildings, and focusing on 
management and maintenance issues later, was sufficient enough to solve the housing 
crisis.138 
 Many of NYCHA’s early policies regarding public housing mirror CHA policy 
under the directorship of Elizabeth Wood.  However, Wood was regularly at odds with 
city hall and other CHA staff who felt her style of management was overly paternalistic.  
These same claims were made against the NYCHA however, leadership understood that 
in order for public housing to remain a viable program, this kind of oversight was 
necessary.  It seems that the experience New York City housing administrators had in 
large family style housing is what best prepared them for successful public housing 
policy.  It is also important to note that the NYCHA used significantly less federal 
funding than the CHA, giving them the ability to implement policy unique to, and 
necessary for, NYC specifically, without as much federal oversight.139   
 Most of the NYC’s public housing successes are attributed to its housing 
authority’s tightly controlled management style throughout its tenure.  Not only has the 
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NYCHA historically always been considered to be highly involved in project housing 
daily management, the authority regularly allowed for resident management as a means 
for operation in buildings where showed aptitude for administration.  Since the early 
1940’s, the NYCHA kept a larger staff than most other housing authorities to maintain 
buildings and grounds to emphasize the importance of upkeep.140 From its onset, 
NYCHA leaders maintained this comparatively sizable staff as a means to ensure that 
public housing projects would be properly cared for.  Administrators emphasized 
beautification so that residents would feel a sense of pride in their surroundings and treat 
the buildings as their homes and communities.  Strict guidelines were set in place in 
terms of maintaining individual property, and they were rigorously enforced.  Individuals 
who did not adhere to the guidelines and who were found not to be sufficiently caring for 
their units were ultimately removed from their residences.  These rules mirrored early 
CHA guidelines, however, the CHA became incredibly lax in its enforcement and 
allowed individuals to remain living in their units even if they were not being cared for 
because it lacked the ability and resources to police every unit.   
NYCHA made administrative visits to every unit on a regular basis a priority and 
often did regular apartment inspections.  Early on, it also established a somewhat 
controversial rent collection system in which residents were required to come to their 
local NYCHA office on a monthly, or sometimes weekly, basis to pay their rent.  At 
these offices, social workers, on NYCHA staff, collected rents and also worked with 
tenants to get them enlisted in what social service programs they may have needed at the 
time.  This system saw a great deal of success and positive feedback for a period of time, 
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although many believed it was paternalism in raw form.  Other housing authorities 
attempted to implement similar systems but did not achieve the longevity of the 
NYCHA.141  These kinds of policies made for a tightly managed housing system that was 
unpopular in other cities, but was highly effective in NYC in terms of building upkeep 
and maintaining a working relationship between the NYCHA and the resident population. 
Another reason that the NYCHA saw much greater success than the CHA is due 
to its resident screening processes.  The NYCHA never abandoned its mission to house 
not only low-income welfare families, but middle-income families as well.  By the late 
1960’s, the CHA was almost exclusively housing welfare families, collecting very little 
rent to aid in their ability to maintain buildings.  With concern that support for public 
housing would suffer if it became solely populated with welfare recipients, the NYCHA 
sought to ensure that working class families remained eligible for the program.  The 
agency viewed public housing, “as a municipal service, rather than a social welfare 
program.”142  Wanting the class and racial make-up of public housing to reflect NYC as a 
whole, legislators enacted policy to ensure working class families remained a part of the 
program well into the 1960’s, where as other cities, like Chicago had begun allowing 
nearly all of their developments to become completely occupied by welfare families by as 
early as the 1940’s.143 
Chicago’s project housing high rise’s design are often cited as part of the reason 
for so many of public housing’s problems in the city.  New York also had a great deal of 
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high-rise public housing buildings, but did not experience the same level of difficulty in 
their structures. Hunt explains: 
When the NYCHA’s postwar high-rises experienced social disorder because of 
youth vandalism in the mid-1950’s, the city instituted an aggressive policy 
strategy, including vertical patrols, in an effort to control crime. Fortunately, New 
York built significantly fewer bedrooms per apartment than Chicago, housing 
only 1.8 minors per unit versus Chicago’s average of 3.1, aiding the social control 
effort.144  
The overall difference between public housing in New York City and Chicago is New 
York’s willingness to spend money and staff the program accordingly from 
administration to ground level workers.  The CHA regularly looked for ways to cut costs, 
which came at the expense of the tenants.  Its unwillingness to invest in the program 
caused rapid deterioration.  Along the way, different leaders, visionaries, and 
organizations attempted to step in to implement policy to get the system back on track, 
but the CHA was never able to obtain longevity with any strategy to see real positive 
results, thus its subsequent federal take overs.  
 Residents of Chicago public housing have worked tirelessly since the program’s 
inception for their right to live with just the basic necessities, working appliances, crime 
and drug-free environments, places without animal and insect infestations, and basic 
plumbing and electrical needs.  As the Great Depression swept the United States in the 
1930’s, President Franklin Roosevelt and his administration rolled out progressive New 
Deal programs that Americans so desperately needed.  Public housing policy was met 
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with great enthusiasm and as the first residents began moving into newly constructed 
housing complexes in Chicago, they felt hopeful that their lives were taking a step in a 
positive direction.  Having a safe, clean place to live was a basic need that many had 
never experienced.   
 However, the Chicago Housing Authority succeeded in thwarting many of these 
individual’s plans through poor building construction and planning, substandard 
maintenance, and neglect of tenant needs.  However, there are more underlying 
motivations that must be evaluated in order to better grasp Chicago public housing’s 
downfall, including resident involvement in managing their complexes.   
 Public housing in Chicago cannot be understood as a policy without evaluating 
the role that residents played in policymaking.  It has been easy to overlook their 
accomplishments because much of the strides residents made in bettering their lives were 
often limited to their own buildings.  Residents often came together to assign each other 
building maintenance tasks that should have been taken care of by the CHA, but usually 
were not.  Eventually, many of these groups became politicized and were able to effect 
change from within the CHA, all the way up to the federal level.  This is evidenced in 
resident’s successful campaign to gain resident management status through various 
programs after 1987.   
 Chicago public housing residents generally have a reputation of being lazy, prone 
to drugs, violence, crime, as well as uneducated and apolitical.  However, a closer look at 
their lives reveals a different story.  As the CHA continuously attempted to shut residents 
out of any decision making processes, residents valiantly fought back to have their voices 
heard.  Today, resident groups exist as a constant figure in Chicago public housing 
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complexes.  Thanks to the efforts of those residents who worked to have a say in the 
direction of public housing policy in Chicago, current residents now are able to sign up to 
be a part of Local Advisory Boards, and programs are in place that allow residents to 
work in their complexes and receive job training.  The CHA continues to have issues 
meeting compliance standards set by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
across the board however, residents are steadfast in their fight to demand that these 
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